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Appeals, Interlocutory and

Discretionary Applications, and
Post-Judgment Motions in the
Georgia Courts: The Current
Practice and the Need for Reform
Legislation
by Edward C. Brewer, III*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The old saying, "appellate judges spend all of their time looking for
error, while trial judges spend all of theirs seeking the truth" has no justice to it, however accurate its literal description of the litigation process.'
It is correct, however, that before the search for truth can begin at the
appellate level, the supreme court or court of appeals must look for any
error concerning the timeliness of the appeal. The practicing attorney,
therefore, must know whether an order or judgment is appealable; and if
so, when, where, and how should it be appealed?
The Appellate Practice Act of 1965,1 together with important amendments in 1966, 1968, 1975, 1979, and 1984,3 made a comprehensive reviAssociate in the firm of Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, Atlanta, Georgia. University of the South (B.A., 1975); Vanderbilt University (J.D., 1979). Member, State Bars of
Georgia and Alabama.
1. The Honorable Harold G. Clarke, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia,
quoted this amusing aphorism in his address at the Atlanta Bar Association's Bench and
Bar Reception (May 10, 1990).
2. 1965 Ga. Laws 18 (presently codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-30 to -34 and §§ 5-6-36 to -51
(1982 & Supp. 1992)).
3. 1984 Ga. Laws 599; 1979 Ga. Laws 619; 1975 Ga. Laws 757, 759, §§ 1, 3; 1968 Ga. Laws
1072, § 1; 1966 Ga. Laws 493, 496 (all presently codified as amended at OC.G.A. §§ 5-6-34, -
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sion of appellate practice and procedure in Georgia.' The Act drew on
prior Georgia statutes and then-existing appellate provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Its features were, in turn, thoughtfully
considered when the Civil Practice Act of 1966, adapted from the Federal
Rules, was enacted in the following year. s Today, an understanding of the
significant differences between Georgia's post-judgment and appellate
practice and their federal counterpart is one of the basic tools of any
Georgia attorney.
Such an understanding is not easy to come by, even more than twentyfive years after the enactment of these statutes. Although the Georgia appellate courts have resolved some of the analytical pitfalls and practical
problems in post-judgment and appellate practice, that body of law is far
from comprehensive. The statutes and decisions pose significant dangers,
some evident and others unforeseeable, for Georgia attorneys who must
decide when, where, and how to file a notice or application for appeal.
This Article will examine the provisions governing the entry of judgments
and final orders, resetting post-judgment motions and their effect on the
time for the notice or application for appeal, and direct, interlocutory,
and discretionary appeals. Further, this Article will propose amendments
to the appropriate Georgia statutes, including the Appellate and Civil
Practice Acts, to clarify the rules of appeal and to reduce the risk that a
notice or application for appeal will be found untimely.7

II. THE MEANING OF "FINAL JUDGMENT" AND
A.

"ENTRY OF JUDGMENT"

The "Final Judgment" Rule

Section 5-6-34(a)(1) of the Appellate Practice Act provides that
"[aippeals may be taken to the Supreme Court and the court of appeals
from ... [a]ll final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer
35, -38(a), and 9-11-56(h) (1982 & Supp. 1992)),, Amendments to the discretionary application procedure in 1986 and 1988 are discussed infra text accompanying notes 66.81.
4. Less comprehensive proposals and reforms had been made in the 1950s. See generally, e.g., B. Freeman Leverett, The Appellate ProcedureAct of 1965, 1 GA. ST. B.J. 451, 451
(1965). Some aspects of appellate practice prior to the 1965 Act are addressed by the dissent
in Allen v. Rome Kraft Co., 114 Ga. App. 717, 721-23, 152 S.E.2d 618, 622 (1966) (Pannell,

J., dissenting).
5. In particular, rules 6(b) and 73(a) of the Federal Rules, which were incorporated into
rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1967. See Advisory Committee

Note, 43 F.R.D. 61 (1968).
6. 1966 Ga. Laws 609 (codified in scattered sections of O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-1 to -125
(1982)).
7. The similar issues arising in superior court review of decisions of the inferior courts
and in special statutory proceedings are beyond the scope of this Article.
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pending in the court below

....

,,s
The Civil Practice Act implicitly re-

fers to this provision in section 9-11-54(a), by stating that "[tihe term
'judgment' . . . includes a decree and any order from which an appeal

lies"' and further specifies that "all judgments shall be signed by the
judge and filed with the clerk."' 0
Section 9-11-54(b) provides, and section 5-6-34(a)(1)'s requirement that
the action be "no longer pending"" means, that in cases concerning multiple claims or parties, an order disposing of fewer than all claims or parties is not final for purposes of appeal."2 This principle has four exceptions. First, the trial judge may direct the entry of a final judgment upon
an express determination of finality under section 9-11-54(b) of the Civil
Practice Act."8 Second, the trial judge may certify the order for interlocutory review under section 5-6-34(b) of the Appellate Practice Act." Third,
an order entered under section 5-6-34(a)(2) through (a)(9) is final without
regard to the pendency of other claims or the presence of other parties."s
Fourth, section 9-11-56(h) provides that "(a]n order granting summary
judgment on any issue or as to any party shall be subject to review by
appeal."' 6 That subsection also provides that "[aln order denying summary judgment shall be subject to review by direct appeal in accordance
with subsection (b) of Code Section 5-6-34.""11 Like an interlocutory certification that must be taken within ten days,' an appeal under section 911-56(h) must be taken within thirty days of the entry of the order granting summary judgment or must await the entry of final judgment."' A
8. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1992).
9. Id. § 9-11-54(a) (1982).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 5-6-34(a)(1).
12. Id. § 9-11-54(b); see Wise v. Georgia State Bd. for Examination, Qualification & Registration of Architects, 244 Ga. 449, 260 S.E.2d 477 (1979); Holland v. Holland Heating &
Air Conditioning, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 213, 416 S.E.2d 557 (1992).
13. The court of appeals has introduced significant uncertainty under this section by
treating as final an order that did not contain the express findings required by section 9-1154(b). American Express Co. v. Baker, 192 Ga. App. 21, 23-24, 383 S.E.2d 576, 579 (1989).
But see Deljou v. Sharp Boylston Mgt. Co., 194 Ga. App. 505, 391 S.E.2d 27 (1990).
14. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b) (1982).
15. Westberry v. Saunders, 250 Ga. 240, 242, 296 S.E.2d 596, 598 (1982). The appealabil-'
ity of specific types of orders under section 5-6-34(a)(2) through (a)(9) is beyond the scope
of this Article. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(2) to (a)(9) (1982).
16. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(h) (1982); see Cuiwell v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 242 Ga. 242, 248
S.E.2d 641 (1978); Artis v. Gaither, 199 Ga. App. 114, 404 S.E.2d 322 (1991).
17. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(h); see infra text accompanying notes 54-66; see also Middle Ga.
Bank v. Continental Real Estate & Assocs., 168 Ga. App. 611, 309 S.E.2d 893 (1983).
18. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b) (Supp. 1992).
19. Olympic Dev. Group v. American Druggists' Ins. Co., 175 Ga. App. 425, 425, 333
S.E.2d 622, 624 (1985). It is particularly important to recognize that when the grant of summary judgment is made final by certification under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-54(b) (1982), the appel-
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grant of summary judgment in a case covered by the discretionary appeal
provisions of section 5-6-35(a) requires an application for appeal despite
section 9-11-56(h).20 As with a direct appeal, a motion for rehearing does
not reset the time for a section 9-11-56(h) appeal.21
B. The "Entry'of Judgment" Rule
The entry of an appealable decision or order sets the appellate timetable in motion, and it is here-at the very beginning of the appellate process-that statutory definitions begin to pose problems for the practitioner. In Turner v. Harper,"s the supreme court observed that "the filing
with the clerk of a judgment, signed by the judge, constitutes the 'entry'
'2 3
of the judgment within the meaning of the Appellate Practice Act.
This must be distinguished from the federal practice, which defines the
entry of judgment as its physical inscription on the clerk's
docket sheet
2
chronologically and indicating the date of the notation.

The "filing as entry" language can cause confusion, as illustrated in
Storch v. Hayes Microcomputer Products, Inc.' and Gates Rental, Inc.
6 In Gates Rental, the jury returned a
v. Perry.2
verdict on Saturday, August 15, 1981, and the deputy clerk prepared a judgment and stamped it
"Filed in Open Court" on the same day. The clerk received the judgment
and stamped it "Filed in Office" on Monday, August 17, 1981. The court
of appeals held that a motion for new trial filed thirty-one days after August 15 was untimely, reasoning that the judgment had been "filed with
the clerk" on August 15, and that "[nleither the place of filing nor the
deputy status of the clerk is crucial."' 7
In Storch the jury returned a verdict after-hours on April 24, 1986. The
trial judge prepared a judgment on the verdict, stamped the judgment
"Filed in Open Court," and signed it. Thereafter, the clerk of the state
late process must be initiated within 30 days under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a) or § 5-6-35 (1982 &
Supp. 1992), and may not await the entry of a final judgment disposing of the entire action.
Jarallah v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 199 Ga. App. 592, 405 S.E.2d 510 (1991).
20. Jarrett v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 178 Ga. App. 600, 601, 344 S.E.2d 440, 441 (1986).
21. Cleveland v. Fulton County, 196 Ga. App. 168, ' 170-71, 396 S.E.2d 2, 4 (1990).
22. 231 Ga. 175, 200 S.E.2d 748 (1973).
23. Id. at 176, 200 S.E.2d at 749; O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-31, 9-11-58(b) (1982); accord Sharp v.
State, 183 Ga. App. 641, 642, 360 S.E.2d 50, 52 (1987).
24. Lewis & Sheron Enter., Inc. v. Great A & P Tea Co.,'136 Ga. App. 910; 911, 222
S.E.2d 659, 660 (1975); FED, R. Civ. P. 58, 79(a); FED. R, App. P. 4(a)(6). The difference in the
federal and state practices has proven to be confusing, and one Georgia case improperly
applies the federal principle. Bloodworth v. Thompson, 230 Ga. 628, 629, 198 S.E.2d 293,
294 (1973).
25. 181 Ga. App. 627, 627, 353 S.E.2d 350, 351 (1987).
26. 164 Ga. App. 297, 297-98, 297 S.E.2d 79, 80 (1982).
27. Id. at 297-98, 297 S.E.2d at 80.
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court received the judgment and stamped it "Filed in Office" on May 2,
1986. Appellant filed the notice of appeal on May 30, 1986, within thirty
days after receipt in the clerk's office, but more than thirty days after
entry in open court." The court of appeals held that the notice was untimely, reasoning that under section 9-11-5(e), the filing of papers with
the judge was intended to have the same effect as filing with the clerk.2 '
The court concluded that "the filing of the judgment in open court with
the trial
judge was the entry of judgment within the meaning of OCGA §
''
5-6.31. 30

C. Clear and Unambiguous Practice Under the "Filing as Entry"
Provision
The "filing as entry" rule requires that the attorney pay careful attention to post-trial events and circumstances in the trial court: simply put,
the first date stamp, whether signed by the judge or signed by the clerk,
controls the- initial setting of the time for appeal. The trial courts and
clerks could greatly assist practicing attorneys by attention to two practical suggestions here.
First, the same-day transmission of final orders and judgments would
eliminate any ambiguity in the filing date of the final order or judgment
since, under the present system in most courts, the clerk's office would
stamp the document "Filed" on the same day.31 Second, any problems
from delayed filing with the clerk could be resolved through a "onestamp" rather than a "two-stamp" approach to the trial judge's filing of
documents, or the clerk's filing of a document elsewhere than in open
court. Under section 9-11-5(e) as applied in Storch, the date filed with
the trial judge or deputy clerk would control, whereas the later physical
receipt of the document in the clerk's office would be undefined, and presumably without effect, under both practice acts.3 2

28. 181 Ga. App. at 627, 353 S.E.2d at 351.
29. Id. But see Smith v. Forrester, 145 Ga. App. 281, 243 S.E.2d 575 (1978). The rule
was otherwise prior to the Civil Practice Act. See New England Mortgage Sec. Co. v. Collins,
115 Ga. 104, 41 S.E. 270 (1902).
30. 181 Ga. App. at 627, 353 S.E.2d at 351. Compare Akin v. Sanders, 228 Ga. 251, 184

S.E.2d 660 (1971) and Moncrief v. Tara Apartments, Ltd., 162 Ga. App. 695, 293 S.E.2d 352
(1982).
31. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-5(e) (1982); see Eller v. State, 183 Ga. App. 724, 726, 360 S.E.2d 53,
55-56 (1987) (Beasley, J., concurring).
32. Such a set of stamps, with appropriately sized typefaces, might look something like

22
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APPEALS FROM SIMPLE JUDGMENTS AND INTERLOCUTORY
APPLICATIONS FOR APPEAL

Section 5-6-48(b)(1) of the Appellate Practice Act88 provides that a
timely notice of appeal is, in the supreme court's words, an "absolute requirement" for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction."' Section 5-6-38(a)
provides that when no resetting post-judgment motions have been filed,
"(a] notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of .
,,s The same language
governs both appeals from simple judgments and appeals after the disposition of post-judgment motions, but is subject to different interpretations in the two contexts.
A.

Appeals from Simple Judgments

The supreme court originally gave a literal interpretation to the requirement that a notice of appeal be filed within thirty days after entry of
the final judgment. In Gibson v. Hodges, 6 the court held that a notice of
appeal filed after entry of an order complained of, but prior to the entry
of judgment on that order, was untimely and subject to dismissal.3 The
court abandoned that strict rule in Gillen v. Bostick,8 when it held that a
****F I L E D
-

****F I L E D

in open court

in open court

in _
_in
on _o-n___/19__

on

Clerk of Court
by
Deputy Clerk

Judge

Received in Office
on .---- /___/19
Deputy Clerk

chambers

-

.

Received in Office
on.
Deputy Clerk

33. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-48(b)(1) (1982).
34. Id.; see, e.g., Jordan v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 343, 191 S.E.2d 530 (1972); Buckhead Doctors' Bldg., Inc. v. Oxford Fin. Cos., 116 Ga. App. 503, 157 S.E.2d 767 (1967).
35. O.C.G.A. §, 5-6-38(a) (1982 & Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
36. 221 Ga. 779, 147 S.E.2d 329 (1966), overruled by Gillen v. Bostick, 234 Ga. 308, 215
S.E.2d 676 (1975).
37. 221 Ga. at 782, 147 S.E.2d at 332. Cf. Abrahamsen v. McDonald's Corp., 197 Ga.
App. 624, 398 S.E.2d 861 (1990) (premature motion for attorney fees).
38. 234 Ga. 308, 215 S.E.2d 676 (1975).
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notice of appeal filed in the "temporal trap"' between 40entry of a dispository order and entry of a final judgment was timely.
The Gillen rule appears to have some inherent limits. These arise from

the necessity of some dispositive order (by the trial judge) or event (for
example, a jury verdict) before an .appeal will be considered timely." The
only other requirement appearing so far is that a final judgment must be
entered at some point if the appeal from the earlier order is to be
effective .42

The supreme court also has held that a party who mislabels the order
or judgment appealed from will not have a timely appeal dismissed so
long as no prejudice results from the mistake. In Steele' v. Cincinnati
Insurance Co.," the appeal was taken from "'the order of this [the trial]
court. . . granting defendant's motion for a directed verdict,'" and not
from the final judgment.4 ' The supreme court held that the appellant's
error, having "misnamed the action appealed from and labeled it an order
instead of a judgment entered on the order," rendered the notice of appeal technically defective but did not justify dismissal of the appeal.46

An order clarifying or correcting the judgment may be a final, appealable decision in its own right. In West v. Nodvin, 7 the court of appeals
order "constiheld that a corrective order under the section 9-11-60(g)
4
tuted a final order which is directly appealable." 8

Factors other than statutory construction clearly have played a role in
the Georgia courts' decisions on the timing of a notice of criminal appeal.
In Oller v. State," the court of appeals held that a late-filing defendant
had "substantially complied" with the timeliness requirement of section

39. Robert W. Beynart, Esquire, of Atlanta, Georgia, coined the terminology used herein
to describe the rules of the decisions in Gillen and Steele.
40. 234 Ga. at'310, 215 S.E.2d at 678. But see Anthony v. Anthony, 236 Ga. 508, 224
S.E.2d 349 (1976); Gwinnett County v. Grant, 181 Ga. App. 304, 352 S.E.2d 391 (1986).
41. See Jones v. Singleton, 253 Ga. 41, 316 S.E.2d 154 (1984).
42. Boatright v. Sunshine Toyota, Inc., 177 Ga. App. 332, 332, 339 S.E.2d 275, 275
(1985); see In re J.B., 195 Ga. App. 520, 394 S.E.2d 143 (1990).
43. See Steele v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 252 Ga. 58, 311 S.E.2d 470 (1984).
44.. 252 Ga. 58, 311 S.E.2d 470 (1984); accord Pico, Inc. v. Mickel, 138 Ga. App. 856, 230
S.E.2d 488 (1976).
45. 252 Ga. at 59, 311 S.E.2d at 470.
46. Id. at 59-60, 311 S.E.2d at 471. But see Ballew v. State, 225 Ga. 547, 548, 170 S.E.2d
242, 243 (1969) (some judgment must be specified); Whiddon v. Stargell, 192 Ga. App. 826,
828, 386 S.E.2d 884, 886 (1989) (unamended notice that specifies nonappealable order subject to dismissal).
47. 197 Ga. App. 92, 397 S.E.2d 581 (1990).
48. Id. at 94, 397 S.E.2d at 584.
49. 187 Ga. App. 818, 371 S.E.2d 455 (1988).
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5-6-38(a) and affirmed the grant of an out-of-time appeal." On the facts,
the court 'in Oiler had available an alternative holding, as in Storch v.
Hayes Microcomputers, Inc.,51 that defendant's earlier filing of a letter
with the trial judge constituted the filing required by section 5-6-38(a)."
Instead, the majority reasoned that defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel would have required the timely appointment of an appellate attorney.53 Whether this constitutional right required the judicial
creation of an exception for out-of-time appeals, however, is open to
question.
B. Interlocutory Applications for Appeal
The General Assembly amended the Appellate Practice Act in 1968 to
provide for interlocutory appeals "[wihere the trial judge in rendering an
order, decision or judgment not otherwise subject to direct appeal certifies within ten (10) days of entry thereof that such order, decision or
judgment is of such importance to the case that immediate review should
be had."5' The interlocutory appeal provision was changed in 1975 to give
the appellate courts discretion to permit or refuse an interlocutory appeal, to require the filing of an application for interlocutory appeal5
within ten days of the entry" of the trial court's certification, 57 and to
establish a procedure for the application and a response. 8 If the court
permits the interlocutory appeal, the applicant must file a subsequent notice of appeal within ten days after issuance of the order granting
review. 9
The differences between a section 9-11-54(b) determination and a section 5-6-34(b) certification are significant. An order rendered final under
section 9-11-54(b) must dispose of the claim or party that it covers.6 0 An
order certified under section 5-6-34(b) may dispose of less than a complete claim; for example, the issue of liability only."' A section 9-11-54(b)
50. Id. at 819, 371 S.E.2d at 455 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 1-3-1(c) & 5-6-30 (1982 & Supp.
1992)). But see O.C.G.A. § 5-6-48(b) (1982).
51. 181 Ga. App. 627, 353 S.E.2d 350 (1987).
52. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38(i) (1982).
53. 187 Ga. App, at 819, 371 S.E.2d at 457-58.
54. 1968 Ga. Laws 1072, § 1 (presently codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b)
(1982 & Supp. 1992)).
55. Hargraves v. Turner, 160 Ga. App. 807, 287 S.E.2d 664 (1982).
56. Turner v. Harper, 231 Ga. 175, 200 S.E.2d 748 (1973).
57. Miller v. State, 180 Ga. App. 710, 711, 350 S.E.2d 313, 314 (1986).
58. 1975 Ga. Laws 757, § 1 (presently codified at O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b) (1982 & Supp.
1992)).
59. Id.
60. Cryomedics, Inc. v. Smith, 180 Ga. App. 336, 337, 349 S.E.2d 223, 224 (1986).
61. Havischak v. Neal, 176 Ga. App. 203, 203, 335 S.E.2d 469, 470 (1985).
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determination that should have been entered by the trial court as a section 5-6-34(b) certification may be treated as properly certified under the
latter section, in which case the ten-day timeframe may not apply.62
When a court certifies a nonfinal order or judgment under section 5-634(b), the appellant should not treat it as a section 9-11-54(b) determination even if it disposes of a claim or party. 5s
Once the party ascertains the trial court's treatment and the proper
characterization of the order, the timetable for an appeal becomes important. A section 9-11-54(b) determination is a final judgment appealable
under section 5-6-34(a)(1) or section 5-6-35(a) within thirty days.' A section 5-6-34(b) certification requires that an application for leave to file an
appeal be filed within ten days."' Georgia courts can certify an order
under section 5-6-34(b) within ten days of entry but otherwise cannot certify an order by an out-of-time amendment to provide for immediate
review. 6
IV. THE DISCRETIONARY APPLIcATION PROVISIONS
A.

The Scope of the Statute

The enactment of the Discretionary Appeals amendments in 1979,7 adding present section 5-6-35 to the Appellate Practice Act, freed the Georgia courts from direct appeals in certain administrative or lower-court reviews 6 and domestic relations cases.6 9 The General Assembly broadened
62. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 242 Ga. 176, 249 S.E.2d 588 (1978). But
see All Risk Ins. Agency v. Rockbridge Sanitation Co., 166 Ga. App. 728, 305 S.E.2d 390
(1982). '
63. See O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b) (1982 & Supp. 1992).
64. Thompson v. Clarkson Power Flow, Inc., 149 Ga. App. 284, 254 S.E.2d 401, a/'d, 244
Ga. 300, 260 S.E.2d 9 (1979).
65. See Graves v. Dean, 166 Ga. App. 186, 303 S.E.2d 751 (1983).
66. Summer Tree Club Apartments Assocs. v. Graves Constr. Co., 140 Ga. App. 214, 230
S.E.2d 503 (1976). A mistake on this point is not fatal because the failure to take an interlocutory appeal does not preclude a later appeal from the final judgment. Turner v. Harper,
231 Ga. 175, 200 S.E.2d 748 (1973); Goolsby v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 Ga. App. 881, 204
S.E.2d 789 (1974). It can, however, be difficult to explain to the trial judge who certified the
order or the client who must then await an appeal from the final judgment.
67. .1979 Ga. Laws 619, § 3 (presently codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 (1982 &
Supp. 1992)).
68. Russell v. City of East Point, 261 Ga. 213, 403 S.E.2d 50 (1991); Johnson v. Llewellyn, 194 Ga. App. 186, 390 .S.E.2d 94 (1990). But see Phillips v. State, 261 Ga. 190, 402
S.E.2d 737 (1991) (review of probate decision); Copeland v. White, 178 Ga. App. 644, 344
S.E.2d 436 (1986).
69. Granberry v. Granberry, 260 Ga. 539, 539, 399 S.E.2d 72, 72 (1990); Horton v. Kitchens, 259 Ga. 446, 446, 383 S.E.2d 871, 871 (1989) (third-party appieal); Joyner v. Joyner, 197
Ga. App. 304, 305, 398 S.E.2d 294, 294 (1990).
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section 5-6-35 in 1984, 1986, and 1988 to include applications for appeal
from a variety of minor civil and criminal cases,"' probation revocations, 1
temporary restraining orders' 2 and orders on certain post-judgment motions.'8 The orders on motions include denial of an extraordinary motion
for new trial, ' denial of a section 9-11-60(d) motion to set aside, 7 denial
of the section 9-11-60(e) complaint in equity to set aside available prior
to 1986,76 and awards of attorney fees and expenses of litigation under
7

section 9-15-14.1

The parties now take appeals from those proceedings and motions by
discretionary application for leave to appeal; direct appeals are dismissed
if the party should have used the discretionary application procedure.78
Under Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Rayle,7 appellate review of
any motion or proceeding covered by that section is obtained through an
application for appeal "whether the judgment be final, interlocutory or
summary."80 Some attorneys manage any uncertainty as to the application of section 5-6-34 or 5-6-35 by the timely filing of both a notice of
appeal and an interlocutory or, in the alternative,' discretionary application, together with any second notice required under section 5-6-34(b) or
5-6-35(g) 1 if the court grants the application. An interlocutory appeal in
70. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(6), (a)(11) (1982 & Supp. 1992); see Georgia Dep't
of Human Resources v. Prince, 198 Ga. App. 329, 401 S.E.2d 342 (1991).
71. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. 1992).
72. Id. § 5-6-35(a)(9).
73. Id. § 5-6-35(a)(7), (a)(8), (6)(10); 1988 Ga. Laws 1357, § 1; 1986 Ga. Laws 1591, § 2;
1984 Ga.Laws 599, § 2 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a) (1982 & Supp. 1992)).
74. O.C.G.A. § 5-5-41 (1982); see Turner v. Binswanger, 203 Ga. App.. 319, 417 S.E.2d
221 (1992).
75. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d) (1982); see Faircloth v. Greiner, 260 Ga. 682, 401 S.E.2d 11
(1990); Marshall v. Gatison, 197 Ga. App. 370, 398 S.E.2d 429 (1990).
76. 1966 Ga. Laws 609 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(e) (1982)). Now that the complaint in equity has been abolished as a means of collateral attack on a judgment, 1986 Ga.
Laws 294 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(e) (1982 & Supp. 1992)), it eventually will be appropriate to amend section 5-6-35(a)(8) to delete the reference to appeals in such cases.
77. O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 (Supp. 1992). Section 5-6-35(a) does not make reference to, and
presumably does not encompass, the "post-Yost" provisions of O.C.G.A. §§ 51-7-80 to -85
(Supp. 1992).
78. Id. § 5-6-35 (1982). See, e.g., Miles v. Collins, 259 Ga. 536, 384 S.E.2d 630 (1989);
Service Truck Brokers v. Kellco Transp., Inc., 196 Ga. App. 702, 397 S.E.2d 53 (1990). In an
appropriate case, the appellate court may dismiss the application as having been "improvidently granted." Vulcan Materials Co. v. Upshaw, 197 Ga.App. 604, 399 S.E.2d 584 (1990).
79. 246 Ga. 727, 273 S.E.2d 139 (1980).
80. Id. at 730, 273 S.E.2d at 142; accord Henderson v. Mrs. Smith's Frozen Foods, 182
Ga. App. 829, 357 S.E.2d 271 (1987).
81. O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-34(b), 5-6-35(g) (1982 & Supp. 1992).
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a case listed in section 5-6-35(a) must comply with both section 5-6-35
82
and section 5-6-34(b).
B.

The Deficiencies in the Statutory Coverage

The provisions of section 5-6-35(a) must be read carefully, because no
provision is certain to apply and because more than one may apply to a
particular case. Several of the provisions for minor civil cases are either
incomplete, ambiguous, variable in their application to a given type of
case, or some combination thereof.
Garnishment and Attachment Cases. Subsection (a)(4) requires a
discretionary application in garnishment and attachment cases, but excludes appeals concerning attachment against "fraudulent debtors" covered by section 5-6-34(a)(5).83 Since subsection (a)(1) covers orders
($granting or refusing" attachment, the subsection presumably covers
cases in which fraud is alleged, not merely when it is proven.8
Judgments for $10,000 or Less. Subsection (a)(6) is reasonably
specific, requiring a discretionary application in "all actions for damages
in which the judgment is $10,000.00 or less," but the section does not
address the issues of including interest, costs, or other nonprincipal
amounts.8s In Todd v. City of Brunswick"' and Brown v. Associates Financial Services Corp.,8" the court of appeals initially held that subsection (a)(6) "requires that an application for discretionary review be filed
when the amount placed in controversy by the claimant (plaintiff, coun82. See infra text accompanying notes 147-60.
83. O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-34(a)(5), -35(a)(4) (1982 & Supp. 1992).
84. Id. § 5-6-35(a)(4).
85. But cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988) (diversity jurisdiction when the "matter in controversy" exceeds $50,000, "exclusive of interest and costs"). Subsection (a)(6) originally required an application for appeal of a judgment for $2500 or less, and was amended in 1991
to raise the threshold amount to $10,000. 1991 Ga. Laws 412, §§ 1, 2 (H.B. 70); see Heuer
Industrials, Inv. v. Crum, 202 Ga. App. 675, 415 S.E.2d 307 (1992).
In Castleberry's Food Co. v. Smith, No. A92A1486 (Ga. App. Oct. 6, 1992), the court of
appeals held that "for establishing jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(6), a judgment is comprised of principal, plus costs, plus interest at the legal rate accrued from the
date of the filing of the judgment until the date of the filing of the notice of appeal." Id.
This new rule of law clarifies the costs issue, but its net effect is to complicate the jurisdictional issue by depending upon the expression and computation of interest under a judgment. Since the issue was not presented, the decision does not resolve the classification of
attorney fees and expenses under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-37 and 9-15-14 (1982).
86. 175 Ga. App. 562, 334 S.E.2d 1 (1985); rev'd, 255 Ga. 448, 339 S.E.2d 589 (1986).
87. 255 Ga. 457, 339 S.E.2d 590 (1986).
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terclaimant or cross-claimant) is $2,500 [now $10,000] or less. '" s The
holding in Brown produced two vigorous dissents, one pointing out that
the holding "does not follow the language of the statute" and the other
observing that "we are dealing with what is and not with what we think it
ought to be."'
The supreme court affirmed the judgment in Todd, but for different
reasons.9 0 The court held that subsection (a)(6) "relates to the final result,
of an action for damages"; "[a] judgment is not relief sought in a complaint or counterclaim."'1 The court established the rule "that O.C.G.A. §
5-6-35(a)(6) sets out the proper method of appeal from monetary judgments ranging from one cent to $2,500 [now $10,000]."1 2 The supreme
court reversed Brown, holding that "[b]y its own terms O.C.G.A. § 5-635(a)(6) applies when there is an action for damages and the-result is a
judgment of $2,500 [now $10,000] or less."' ca The court then held that a
direct appeal was proper because the appeal concerned a writ of possession e9 and remanded the case to the court of appeals for review of the
money judgment."
Rent of $2500 or Less Due Under Warrant. Subsection (a)(3)
requires a discretionary application in "[a]ppeals from cases involving
distress or dispossessory warrants in which the only issue to be resolved is
the amount of rent due and such amount is $2,500.00 or less."' " The subsection (a)(3) "rent-warrants" and subsection (a)(6) "small case" thresholds were originally the same, namely, $2500 or less.' With the 1991
amendment raising the subsection (a)(6) threshold to $10,000, a rent-warrant case may escape the application requirement of subsection (a)(3),
only to fall within subsection (a)(6) if it includes a judgment for $10,000

88. 175 Ga. App. at 553, 554-55, 333 S.E.2d at 889, 890-91 (emphasis added) (giving the
statute "that construction which is most equitable and just"). But see O.C.G.A. § 23-1-6
(1982) ("equity follows the law where the rule of law is applicable and follows the analogy of
the law where no rule is directly applicable"); see also Village Ctrs., Inc. v. DeKalb County,
248 Ga. 177, 281 S.E.2d 522 (1981).
89. 175 Ga. App. at 556, 560, 333 S.E.2d at 891, 894 (Dean, P.J. & Beasley, J.,
dissenting).
90. City of Brunswick v. Todd, 255 Ga. 448, 339 S.E.2d 589 (1986).
91. Id. at 448, 339 S.E.2d at 589.
92. Id.
93. 255 Ga. 457, 457, 339 S.E.2d 590, 590 (1986).
94. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-55 (1982).
95. 255 Ga. at 457, 339 S.E.2d at 591.
96. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1992). An appeal that challenges the grant or
denial of a writ of possession may be taken directly under O.CG.A. § 5-6-34. Brown v.
Associates Fin. Serve. Corp., 255 Ga. 457, 339 S.E.2d 590 (1986); accord Baker v. G.T., Ltd.,
194 Ga. App. 450, 391 S.E.2d 1 (1990).
97. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(3).
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or less. This divarication underscores the attorney's need to review a
judgment for coverage by the discretionary appeal provisions under each
and every subsection of section 5-6-35(a) before settling on a notice of
appeal or application-or both-as the vehicle for appeal.
Of particular interest to attorneys who frequently resort to the dispossessory and distress procedure (and perhaps of more urgent interest to
those who do so infrequently) is that the threshold amount under subsection (a)(3) is the rent due, which does not expressly include any aspect of
the judgment "for any other claim relating to the dispute." 8 A substantive amendment to the dispossessory statute in 1988, to include "[aill
rent and utility payments . . . due,"" was not reflected in subsection

(a)(3).
Strict compliance with the rent due provision would require the judgment to specify the various components of the award, perhaps on special
interrogatories or verdict forms completed by the jury, before the proper
appellate procedure could be identified. This is a terrible amount of
trouble for the appeal of a minor case, but the real estate attorney's
problems are only beginning.
The language of subsection (a)(3), "the amount of rent due,"100 is arguably broader than that of subsection (a)(6), "the judgment. '" 0' This
suggests a possible reading that a claim of more than $2500 brings the
case within the statute. On the other hand, the grammatical sense of the
sentence, "the only issue. . . is the amount of rent due and such amount
is $2,500.00 or less,"10 suggests an amount determined by the court, not
claimed. The court of appeals opinions in Mack v. Third Bedford-Pines
Apartments, Ltd.103 are ambiguous in this regard, and neither the majority opinion nor the special concurrence provides a complete solution to
the questions raised by the fact patterns the opinions recite.
The appellate courts need to decide, at a minimum, whether subsection
(a)(3) will be. governed by the amount in controversy or the amount
stated in a judgment. If it is the latter, additional questions will arise.
Will the courts interpret literally the "rents due" language, and, if so,
how will the courts handle nonspecific judgments? Alternatively, if the
courts include all amounts recovered under the dispossessory or distress
statute, how will they account for different practices in the drafting of
judgments? The courts may wish to establish a bright-line test that will
apply to the face of the initial pleading (or, preferably, the judgment as
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. §§ 44-7-55(a), -77(a) (1982).
1988 Ga. Laws 923, § 2.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(3) (1982).
Id. § 5-6-35(a)(6).
Id. § 5-6-35(a)(3) (Supp. 1992).
193 Ga. App. 838, 389 S.E.2d 404 (1989).
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under subsection (a)(6)) and may wish to reject arguments based upon an
after-the-fact reading of the record. The General Assembly may wish to
assist the courts by providing a statutory solution.
The Inclusion of Costs: Herein of Attorney Fees. The question
of including costs or attorney fees and expenses when calculating the
amount of the claim or judgment under section 5-6-35(a)(3) and (6) must
be addressed in light of three factors. The first is the proper characterization of attorney fees as "damages, costs, fees or expenses" under section
13-6-11;0" section 9-11-37(a)(4), (b), (c), or (d)(1);'0 section 9-15-14;1 06
and sections 51-7-80 to -85.107 The second is the general language of sub-

sections (a)(3) and (a)(6), which does not specifically address costs, attorney fees, or expenses. The third is the language of section 9-15-11 providing for inclusion of costs in the judgment and section 9-11-58(b) requiring
the immediate entry of judgment without delay for the taxing of costs.10 s
A claim for attorney fees and expenses of litigation under section 13-611 is a substantive claim like other elements of damages. 1' 9 In MTW Investment Co. v.Vanguard PropertiesFinancialCorp.," 0 the .court of appeals held that an appeal from the award of $500 in attorney fees under
section 13-6-11 must be taken by application under section 5-635(a)(6)."' The court reasoned that "[olur review of the cases involving
such awards for bad faith convinces us that they are within the category
of 'damages'. . . requiring an application to appeal in all actions in which
the judgment is $2,500 [now $10,000] or less." 1 "2Similarly, the court held
in Ostrom v.Kapetanakos"s that a direct appeal could be taken when
the general damages of $1500 and attorney fees of $1370 totalled
$2870,
4
and subsection (a)(6) was inapplicable by its express terms."1
The statutes do not describe attorney fees awarded for a. motion to
compel discovery or a discovery response that is not "substantially justified" under section 9-11-37(a)(4), (b), (c), or (d)(1) as an independent
claim or as costs to be taxed."' The court of appeals may have treated
104.

O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (1982 & Supp. 1992).

105. Id. § 9-11-37(a)(4), (b), (c), or (d)(1) (1982).

106. Id. § 9-15-14.
107. Id. §§ 51-7-80 to -85 (1982 & Supp. 1992).
108. Id. §§ 9-15-11, 9-11-58(b); see supra note 85.
109. Brown v. Baker, 197 Ga. App. 466, 467, 398 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1990).
110. 179 Ga. App. 403, 346 S.E.2d 575, af/d, 256 Ga. 318, 349 S.E.2d 749 (1986).
111. 179 Ga. App. at 405, 346 S.E.2d at 576-77.
112. Id., 346 S.E.2d at 577; see also Landor Condominium Consultants, Inc. v. Colony
Place Condominium Ass'n, 195 Ga. App. 840, 395 S.E.2d 25 (1990).
113. 185 Ga. App. 728, 365 S.E.2d 849 (1988).

114. Id. at 729, 365 S.E.2d at 850.
115. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-37(a)(4), (b), (c), (d)(1) (1982).
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discovery-related fees as costs in American Express Co. v. Baker,"1 6 in
suggesting that the award of such fees was an interlocutory order and
concerned an "award of attorney fees and costs.""' The court further observed that the award could have been made final by certification under
section 5-6-34(b), but the trial court properly treated it as a final judgment because of the trial court's order that the judgment "'may be enforceable by any [plost [j]udgment collection methods, including but not
limited to garnishment, attachment and execution.' "11
Attorney fees and expenses of litigation for frivolous claims and defenses under section 9-15-14 are "awarded" or "assessed" by the trial
judge "by an order of court which shall constitute and be enforceable as a
money judgment." ' ' A section 9-15-14 award generally must be taken up
through an application under section 5-6-35(a)(10) 20 In limited circumstances, some appellate decisions have permitted the review of an award
as a "tag-along" appeal under section 5-6-34(d) in the main direct
appeal. 21
Section 9-11-58(b) provides that "[tihe entry of the judgment shall not
be delayed for the taxing of costs.

122

Since section 9-15-14 is codified

among the provisions on "Court and Litigation Costs" and is captioned
"Litigation costs and attorney's fees," it would seem such court-awarded
fees could be treated as costs for all purposes. The court may also treat
court-awarded fees as part of the judgment under section 9-15-11, which
provides that "[w]hen a case is disposed of, the costs, including fees of
witnesses, shall be included in the judgment against the party voluntarily dismissing, being involuntarily dismissed, or cast in the action.' 2
That does not necessarily mean, however, that the court should treat
those costs as a part of the judgment for purposes of the application of
the discretionary appeals provision.'
116. 192 Ga. App. 21, 383 S.E.2d 576 (1989).
117. Id. at 23-24, 383 S.E.2d at 579.
118. Id. at 23, 383 S.E.2d at 579. The "judgment" contained no language satisfying the
first prong of the two-part requirement of "an express determination that there is no just
reason for delay" and "an express direction for the entry of judgment" under O.C.G.A. § 911-54(b) (1982). See 192 Ga. App. at 24, 383 S.E.2d at 579.
119. O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(f) (1982).
120. Williams v. Clark-Atlanta University, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 51, 406 S.E.2d. 559 (1991).
121. But see infra note 199 and text accompanying notes 161-201.
122. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58(b) (1982).
123. Id. § 9-15-11 (1982 & Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
124. In Deljou v. Sharp Boylston Management Co., 194 Ga. App. 505, 505, 391 S.E.2d 27,
28 (1990), the court observed that "[aJlthough'Deljou's motion for attorneys' fees [under
section 9-15-14] was pending, the trial court entered judgment for Deljou, but did not make
the findings necessary under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-54(b) for a final judgment." Id. at 505, 391
S.E.2d at 28. The court may have been referring to the need for a final judgment ending the
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Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") sections 51-7-80 to 517-85125 provide for recovery of attorney fees in an action to redress abusive litigation. The provision entitled "Measure of Damages" makes reference to damages as including "costs and expenses of litigation and rea12 6
sonable attorney's fees" incurred in the underlying, terminated action.
That section also provides for costs, expenses of litigation, and reasonable
attorney fees in the abusive litigation action.12 7 It appears that the court
should treat costs and fees incurred in the underlying action as part of
the judgment under section 5-6-35(a)(6), while costs and fees in the abusive litigation action itself suffer from the same ambiguity as section 9-1514 fees.
The Treatment of a Defense Judgment. In Brown v. Associates
FinancialServices Corp.,1 2 ' the supreme court explained that application
of section 5-6-35(a)(6) to all cases in which the judgment is for $2500
(now $10,000) or less is based on the General Assembly's intent "to remove the right of direct appeal when a claimant prevails but a fact finder
has determined that the damage suffered is not substantial."' 12 9 The court
held that "[a] direct appeal is available in those cases where the injury is
great but the party seeking compensation loses on liability, and the party
seeking substantial damages gets no judgment." 8 0
The appellate courts have consistently held, after Brown, that a "defense judgment" on a claim, counter-claim, or cross-claim is directly appealable so long as it is final under section 5-6-34(a)(1).' s' A defense judgment may be subject to the discretionary appeals provisions under
1 2
another subsection of section 5-6-35(a). In Motor Finance Co. v. Davis,'

action since there had been an opposing claim, but the opinion can equally be read as suggesting that the pending fee claim necessitated a section 9-11-54(b) determination.
125. O.C.G.A. §§ 51-7-80 to -85 (Supp. 1992).

126. Id. § 51-7-83(b).
127.
128.
129.
130.
395 n.1
reflects

Id. § 51-7-83(a).
255 Ga. 457, 339 S.E.2d 590 (1986).
Id. at 457, 339 S.E.2d at 590.
Id., 339 S.E.2d at 591; see Bales v. Shelton, 260 Ga. 335, 336 n.1, 391 S.E.2d 394,
(1990) ("One cent was chosen rather than zero because a 'take-nothing' verdict often
the jury's decision on liability issues rather than a determination that the damage

involved was low.").
The "defense judgment" rule will permit direct appeals, despite subsection (a)(6), even in
cases in which the original claim was $10,000 or less, when a judgment is entered for the
defendant. The appellate courts thus will receive small-case appeals as well as those cases in
which "the injury is great" and the plaintiff seeks "substantial damages."
131. Honester v. Tinsley, 183 Ga. App. 146, 147, 358 S.E.2d 295, 296 (1987). But see
Lightwerk Studios, Inc. v. Door Units of Ga., Inc., 184 Ga. App. 148, 149, 361 S.E.2d 32, 33
(1987) (pendency of opposing claim).
132. 188 Ga. App. 291, 372 S.E.2d 674 (1988).
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the court of appeals denied a motion to dismiss based on subsection
(a)(6), but later dismissed the appeal from a defense judgment because
the case had begun in the magistrate's court and, under section 5-635(a)(2), was appealable only by application. 3 '
Whether a defense verdict will permit a direct appeal in a real estate
case despite section 5-6-35(a)(3) may be open to question after the court
of appeals interpretation of subsection (a)(3) in Mack v. Third BedfordPines Apartments, Ltd.'3 '1If the decision in Mack means that discretionary appeal coverage under subsection (a)(3) should be determined from
the allegations of the complaint, a defense verdict in which the complaint
seeks $2500 or less may still have to be taken up by a discretionary application. This counsels, if nothing else, that the appellate courts should
read the decision in Mack more narrowly and that the "defense verdict"
exception should apply to both subsections (a)(3) and (a)(6).
The Setting-Off of Defenses, Counter-Claims, and CrossClaims. The issue of setoffs can arise in many different ways, some affecting the judgment itself and some only the verdict, when defenses,
counter-claims, and cross-claims are concerned. In Barikos v. Vanderslice,' the court of appeals held that the amount of the judgment in an
automobile accident case was $2500 or less because the parties had stipulated that any verdict would be reduced by no-fault payments of $5000,
and the jury returned a verdict of $5800.1' The rule in Barikos would
have been relatively simple to administer because the face of such a judgment would reflect the verdict.
In Bales v. Shelton,"'7 the supreme court held that a no-fault setoff
should not be deducted to determine whether a discretionary application
is required.'38 The court further distinguished between "collateral source"
setoffs, which are not deductible, and reductions in damages that do not
133. Id. at 291-92, 372 S.E.2d at 675.
134. 193 Ga. App. 838, 839, 389 S.E.2d 404, 404 (1989); see supra text accompanying
notes 100-03.
135. 177 Ga. App. 884, 341 S.E.2d 513 (1986), overruled by Bales v. Shelton, 260 Ga. 335,
391 S.E.2d 394 (1990).
136. 177 Ga. App. at 884, 341 S.E.2d at 513.
137. 260 Ga. 335, 391 S.E.2d 394 (1990).
138. Id. at 336, 391 S.E.2d at 395. The decision in Bales did not apply to any direct
appellant who filed a direct appeal in reliance on Barikos and prior to Bales. Lee v. Britt,
260 Ga. 757, 400 S.E.2d 5 (1991), rev'g 196 Ga. App. 152, 395 S.E.2d 347 (1990). The supreme court has, however, dismissed appeals upon changing a rule of appellate procedure,
even when the appellant clearly and undisputably relied on an earlier rule of law. See
Scruggs v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 261 Ga. 587, 408 S.E.2d 103 (1991) (appellant's reliance on Strauss v. Strauss, 260 Ga. 327, 393 S.E.2d 248 (1990), decided only one
year earlier, proved'fatal to the appeal).
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arise from a collateral source, which are deductible. 3' The court
reasoned:
The purpose of the statute is to limit appeals in those cases where a jury
has decided that the damage involved was less than $2,500 [now
$10,000]. In a tort action, set-offs to the judgment that arise from some
collateral source-such as prior payments, or pre-existing debts-do not
help to ascertain the price tag for the injury involved in the action
Therefore, such set-offs should not be considered
when deciding whether
140
an application for appeal is necessary.
The court added in a footnote that "[r]eductions in the damages arising
from comparative negligence, failure
to mitigate, etc. are not set-offs that
1 41
arise from a collateral source.

The holding in Bales is a principled one, but it may prove difficult to
manage in practice. The jury's verdict and the judgment will reflect reductions in damages due to partial affirmative defenses, or same-transaction setoffs. In tort cases in which the court asks the jury to determine
whether collateral source payments or other collateral basis setoffs should
be deducted from the award, however, a special interrogatory or verdict
form will have to be used to ascertain the pre-setoff amount of the jury's
determination.
The appellate courts will have to address other jurisdictional questions
under the Bales analysis, such as whether common law recoupments, setoffs, or counterclaims have a collateral basis and, thus, are not to be included in the judgment amount, or whether they are same-transaction
amounts that should be netted out in the calculation. 142 The distinction
between setoff and recoupment under O.C.G.A. sections 13-7-1 to 13-71448 is not likely to provide as clear an answer as the practitioner might
reasonably demand of the Appellate Practice Act. "4 The "same transaction or occurrence" test for compulsory counter-claims and cross-claims

139. 260 Ga. at 336, 391 S.E.2d at 395.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 336 n.2, 391 S.E.2d at 395 n.2. Since "collateral source" is all but a term of art
under the Tort Reform Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-1(b) (1982 & Supp. 1992); see Denton v. ConWay S. Express, Inc., 261 Ga. 41, 402 S.E.2d 269 (1991), the two types of setoffs will be
referred to here as "collateral basis" and "same-transaction" setoffs.
142. See Piedmont Builders, Inc. v. Fullerton, 157 Ga. App. 126, 276 S.E.2d 277 (1981)
(verdict on $15,000 complaint and $25,000 counterclaim).
143. O.C.G.A. §§ 13-7-1 to -14 (1982).
144. See, e.g., Kuhlke Constr. Co. v. Mobley, Inc. 159 Ga. App. 777, 285 S.E.2d 236
(1981); O.C.G.A. § 13-7-3 (1982).
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under the Civil Practice Act likewise may have too little predictive certainty to be useful."' 5
A partial answer to the above problems is that the appellate courts can
take the "true value" of the case into account in deciding whether to
grant the appeal and determining whether the would-be appellant raises
any meritorious or important issue. 1" The first issue, however; is whether
the appeal satisfies the legislative classification. The second issue is
whether practitioners can use the Appellate Practice Act to predict the
results of their actions. Whether the court can administer the statute
(which, clearly, it can) is a tertiary concern. The practical difficulties in
determining the true value through jury interrogatories and verdict forms
will remain in many cases. The potential for confusion will be significant
in personal injury as well as commercial litigation, and the need for some
process by which the courts can avoid the dismissal of appeals because of
an attorney's failure to navigate these shoals with prescience will be essential. It may be that some means of reciprocal treatment of appeals and
applications would provide the best answer.
C. Problems with Interlocutory-DiscretionaryAppeals
Section 5-6-35(b) specifically governs appeals from interlocutory orders
in cases covered under subsection (a)(1) through (11): "[Ilf the order or
judgment [being appealed] is interlocutory, the application shall set forth,
in addition to the enumeration of errors to be urged, the need for interlocutory review.' 47 The statute does not explain how the attorney determines at an interlocutory stage whether a case will fall within subsection
(a)(3) or (a)(6). Under these subsections, a verdict or final judgment may
be required before it is clear whether the case or the appeal involves
$2500 or less or $10,000 or less, respectively." The statute does not place
145. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-13(a) and (g) (1982). On the nonstatutory construct of a compulsory cross-claim, see Citizens Exchange Bank v. Kirkland, 256 Ga. 71, 344 S.E.2d 409
(1986). See also Fowler v. Vineyard, 261 Ga. 454, 405 S.E.2d 678 (1991), rev'g 197 Ga. App.
453, 398 S.E.2d 709 (1990).
146. See Collier v. Department of Human Resources, 196 Ga. App. 843, 397 S.E.2d 632
(1990); Brown v. Associates Financial Services Corp., 175 Ga. App. 553, 559, 333 S.E.2d 888,
894 (1985) (Beasley, J., dissenting), rev'd on other grounds, 255 Ga. 457, 339 S.E.2d 590
(1986).
147, O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(b) (1982).
148. An interlocutory-discretionary appeal from a subsection (a)(6) case may exist only
when a nonfinal judgment has been entered, since that subsection requires a judgment for
$10,000 or less. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(6) (1982 & Supp. 1992). It may be, contrariwise, that an
interlocutory appeal in a real estate case "in which the only issue to be resolved" is rent of
$2500 or less, may exist not only when there is a nonfinal judgment, but also when other
non-final orders are entered and certified. See O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(3)..

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

any specific requirements on the taking of an interlocutory appeal other
than that quoted above.
In Scruggs v. Georgia Department of Human Resources,' 4 the silpreme court held, despite the lack of a specific requirement in section 56-35(b) for the trial court's certificate, that the requirements of section 56-34(b) must be satisfied when the court takes an interlocutory appeal in

a case subject to the discretionary appeal provisions. 150 The supreme
court had held a year earlier in Straus v. Strau"'51 that a trial court cer-

tificate was not required, and the court of appeals had rendered apparently conflicting decisions. 152
There can be no doubt that the insistence upon the trial court's certificate of immediate review is a good idea. As the concurring opinion in

Scruggs pointed out, however, the language of section 5-6-35(b) is more
liberal than that of section 5-6-34(b). 15 1 Unlike section 5-6-34(b), section
5-6-35(b) does not require the trial court's certificate and makes no refer-

ence to section 5-6-34(b) at all.'" The concurring opinion further observed that the court did not address whether the application for an interlocutory-discretionary application should be filed within ten days as
provided in section 5-6-34(b) or thirty days as provided in section .5-6-

35(d).

55

The analytical concerns raised by Scruggs go deeper than an inconsistency with the statutory language. Both the supreme court and the court

of appeals have held that an appellant governed by section 5-6-35 may
not, when a resetting post-trial motion has been filed, take advantage of
the tag-along provision of section 5-6-34(d), which on its face permits re-

view of any other nonfinal order in the case without regard to that order's
appealability. 15" The courts thus require appellants to comply with the

jurisdictional burdens of section 5-6-34, while denying them its jurisdictional benefits.
149. 261 Ga. 587, 408 S.E.2d 103 (1991).
150. Id. at 589, 408 S.E.2d at 104.
151. 260 Ga. 327, 393 S.E.2d 248 (1990) (overruled by Scruggs).
152. Id. at 327, 393 S.E.2d at 249. Compare Rogers v. Department of Human Resources,
195 Ga. App. 118, 392 S.E.2d 713 (1990) (reliance on section 5-6-35(b) was "misplaced");
Neal v. State, 182 Ga. App. 37, 354 S.E.2d 664 (1987) (domestic relations); and English v.
Tucker Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 175 Ga. App. 69, 332 S.E.2d 365 (1985) (garnishment)
with Wallace v. Saks Fifth Avenue Atlanta, Inc., 180 Ga. App. 679, 350 S.E.2d 308 (1986)
(appeal from order opening default in garnishment case; section 5-6-35(a)(4) cited but trial
court's certificate not mentioned).
153. 261 Ga. at 589, 408 S.E.2d at 104.
154. O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-34(b), -35(b) (1982 & Supp. 1992).
155. 261 Ga. at 590, 408 S.E.2d at 104-05.
156. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Yancey, 258 Ga. 802, 375 S.E.2d 39 (1989), aff'g
188 Ga. App. 8, 371 S.E.2d 883 (1988). See infra note 199 and text accompanying notes 161201.
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The difference in Strauss and Scruggs may be summed up as a fundamental shift in appellate policy from an originally broad, inclusive approach to appeals, reflected in sections 5-6-3017 and 5-6-34(d), 118 to a
more recent narrowing of appellate jurisdiction, manifest in section 5-635.150 This shift presents a puzzle for appellate practitioners, particularly

since it occurred without a complete rethinking of the Appellate Practice
Act. The incompleteness of section 5-6-35 and its lack of coordination
with the remainder of the Act make the puzzle difficult. The puzzle is
made insoluble, it is respectfully submitted, by the courts' engrafting of
jurisdictional prerequisites upon statutory language that does not expressly give jurisdictional significance to the appellate pleading in
question.'"
The depth of these policy concerns raises serious questions whether the
entire Appellate Practice Act should be reviewed, a debate be held on the
nature and scope of appellate review and the organization of the Georgia
appellate courts, and appropriate legislation developed. Neither the
courts nor the practicing bar has explicitly called for such a process, and
to do so is beyond both the scope and the intent of this Article. But, at
least, the amendment of section 5-6-35(b) to refine the interlocutory-discretionary appeal procedure should be high on the General Assembly's
list of priorities, to require the trial court's certificate, and otherwise to
harmonize that section with the remainder of the appellate procedure.
D. Problems with "Tag-Along" Discretionary Appeals
The Decision in Kalb and Its Background. The consideration of
problems with applying section 5-6-35 to tag-along appeals, governed in a
direct appeal by section 5-6-34(d) (formerly subsection (c)), begins with an
analysis of appeals from grants of summary judgment under section 9-1156(h) and cross-appeals from denials of summary judgment. The supreme
157. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-30 (1982) ("this article shall be liberally construed so as to bring
about a decision on the merits of every case appealed and to avoid dismissal of any case or
refusal to consider any points raised therein, except as may be specifically referred to in this

article").
158. Id. § 5-6-34(d) (quoted infra text accompanying note 171); see Nodvin v. West, 204
Ga. App. 280, 419 S.E.2d 120 (1992).
159. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 (1982 & Supp. 1992).
160. The court in Scruggs could, for example, have required a trial court's certificate as a
nonjurisdictional component of an interlocutory-discretionary appeal under section 5-635(b), to be submitted either with the application or, if omitted there, as part of a supplemental record handled, for example, by means of a motion to dismiss or an order to show
cause. That method would not have involved an inconsistent interpretation of the statute,
would have met the salutary policy of involving the trial court in the interlocutory appeal,
and would have treated only those requirements disclosed on the face of the statute as
jurisdictional.
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court held in Marietta Yamaha, Inc. v. Thomas 6 1 and Thomas v. McGee1 2 that a party could not cross-appeal the denial of a motion for summary judgment when another party filed a section 9-11-56(h) appeal, but
the court must review the denial under the interlocutory appeal provisions of section 5-6-34(b).163 The court of appeals issued conflicting rulings on the issue, holding in Garrett v. Heisler1 " that a cross-appeal
under section 9-11-56(h) was permissible, 1" and requiring, in Jack V.
v. A.L. Adams Construction Co.,160 a section 5-6-34(b)
Heard Contractors
7
16

certification.

In Marathon U.S. Realties, Inc. v. Kalb,1s" the supreme court overruled
Marietta Yamaha and McGee, based upon its earlier decision in Executive Jet Sales, Inc. v. Jet America, Inc.1s" The court held in Executive
Jet that the denial of a motion to dismiss may be cross-appealed when
another party has appealed from a final judgment certified under section
9-11-54(b).170 The court based the holding upon present section 5-6-34(d):
Where an appeal is taken under any provision of subsection. (a), (b), or
(c) of this Code section, all judgments, rulings, or orders rendered in the
...proceedings below shill be reviewed and determined by the appellate court, without regard to the appealability of the judgment, ruling, or
order standing alone and without regard to whether the judgment, ruling,
or order appealed from was final or was appealable by some other express provision of law ....

171

161. 237 Ga. 840, 229 S.E.2d 753 (1976), overruled by Marathon U.S. Realties, Inc. v.
Kalb, 240 Ga. 390, 260 S.E.2d 85 (1979).
162. 242 Ga. 441, 249 S.E.2d 242 (1978).
163. 237 Ga. at 842-43, 229 S.E.2d at 755; 242 Ga. at 442, 249 S.E.2d at 243.
164. 149 Ga. App. 240, 253 S.E.2d 863 (1979).
165. Id. at 244, 253 S.E.2d at 867.
166. 155 Ga. App. 409, 211 S.E.2d 222 (1980), overruled by Southeast Ceramics, Inc. v.
Klein, 156 Ga. App. 636, 275 S.E.2d 723 (1980).
167. 155 Ga. App. at 410, 271 S.E.2d at 223.
168. 244 Ga. 390, 260 S.E.2d 85 (1979).
169. Id. at 393, 260 S.E.2d at 88; see 242 Ga. 307, 248 S.E.2d 676 (1978).
170. 242 Ga. at 307-08, 248 S.E.2d at 677; see Executive Jet Sales, Inc. v. Jet America,
Inc., 145 Ga. App. 258, 243 S.E.2d 584, rev'd, 242 Ga. 307, 248 S.E.2d 676 (1978). The court
in Executive Jet quoted the pre-O.C.G.A. version of the statute, GA. CoDE ANN. § 6-701
(Harrison 1933), which cross-references only paragraph (a) of the statute. At the time, paragraph (a) contained both the direct appeal provisions of present O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a) (1982
& Supp. 1992) and the interlocutory appeal provisions of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b) (1982 &
Supp. 1992).
171. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(d) (Supp. 1992).
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The court held in Kalb that the same principle permits a cross-appeal in
72
a section 9-11-56(h) appeal.'

The Decision in Klem. In Southeast Ceramics, Inc. v. Kleinms the
supreme court again held that the denial of a summary judgment may be
"appealed without application when it is tied to the appeal of an appealable order or judgment.'' 7 That case dealt with the same party's section
9-11-56(h) appeal from a grant of summary judgment. M The court reasoned that Executive Jet and Kalb "struck a blow for the principle of
judicial economy,' 776 and that the court "frown[s] upon the practice of
appellate review by installment and seek[s] to encourage appellate determination of issues in a case in the fewest possible appellate procedures."" The court also relied upon section 5-6-34(d), as it had done in
7
Executive Jet.

The supreme court extended the Klein holding to applications for discretionary appeal from a simple judgment in Brown v. Associates Financial Services Corp.'"9 The court held that appellant "had a right to direct
appeal from the judgment on writ of possession," because a writ of possession is "a special statutory proceeding which the legislature could have
added to the list of discretionary appeals but did not."' 80 The court further concluded that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal
from dismissal of a counter-claim concerning less than $2500 because
under Klein and section 5-6-34(d), "he could then appeal all other orders
and judgments including the dismissal of his counterclaim."'' To the
same effect is the supreme court's decision in Haggard v.Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia,'8 2 in which the court held that
"a judgment awarding attorney fees and costs of litigation pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 may be reviewed on direct appeal, when it is appealed
as part of a judgment that is directly appealable."''
172,
173.
174.
175.

3

The court in Hag-

237 Ga. at 842-43, 229 S.E.2d at 755.
246 Ga. 294, 271 S.E.2d 199 (1980).
Id. at 295, 271 S.E.2d at 200,
Id.

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 255 Ga. 457, 339 S.E.2d 590 (1986).
180. Id. at 458, 339 S.E.2d at 591.
181. Id. The Klein rule applies only to orders entered as of the time the notice of appeal
is filed. Constanzo v. Jones, 200 Ga. App. 806, 409 S.E.2d 686 (1991).
182. 257 Ga. 524, 360 S.E.2d 566 (1987).
183. Id. at 526, 360 S.E.2d at 568. But see Nash v. Johnson, 192 Ga. App. 412, 385
S.E.2d 294 (1989) (consolidated cases).
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gard distinguished an independent appeal of the attorney fees issue,
which requires an application under section 5-6-35(a). 14'
I The Decisions in Yancey. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. u. Yancey,"' both the court of appeals and the supreme
court addressed the need for a discretionary application when an order
subject to section 5-6-35 is appealed together with a dispositive order on a
resetting post-judgment motion and a judgment directly appealable under
section 5-6-34(a). The supreme court granted certiorari in Yancey to determine whether the Klein rule, permitting the appeal of an order subject
to section 5-6-34(b) as part of a direct appeal under section 5-6-34(a),
applied when the appeal concerned a motion to set aside subject to section 5-6-35(a)."8 6 The court stated the issue as "whether the [discretionary] application procedure can be circumvented by filing a direct appeal
of the denial of the motion for new trial that includes the denial of the
motion to set aside,"18' and held that a discretionary application was required.188 The court did not overrule or address the decision in Haggard,
which held that on a direct appeal from a simple judgment under section
5-6-34(a) issues otherwise cognizable only under section 5-6-35(a) may be
raised without a discretionary application. 9
The supreme court has reaffirmed the Klern and Haggard rules in two
decisions rendered after Yancey. In McClure v.Gower,' 90 following Klein,
the court held that when one party perfects a direct appeal from a simple
judgment, the other party may file a cross-appeal on a money judgment
of $2500 or less without filing a discretionary application."' In Stancil v.
Gwinnett County,'" following Haggard, the court held that a party who
perfects a direct appeal from a simple judgment need not file an application for appeal from an order awarding attorney fees. 1"
Discussion of the Decisions in Kalb, Klem, and Yancey. If a
legislative intent regarding any special status or exclusivity of the discretionary appeals procedure can be discerned in the texts of the several
scattered enactments relating to appellate practice between 1965 and
184. 257 Ga. at 527, 360 S.E.2d at 568.
185. 258 Ga. 802, 375 S.E.2d 39 (1989), aff'g 188 Ga. App. 8, 371 S.E.2d 883 (1988).
186. 258 Ga.at 802, 375 S.E.2d at 40.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Haggard v. Board of Regents, 257 Ga. 524, 360 S.E.2d 566 (1987).
190. 259 Ga. 678, 385 S.E.2d 271 (1989).
191. Id. at 680, 385 S.E.2d at 274.
192. 259 Ga. 507, 384 S.E.2d 666 (1989).
193. Id. at 508, 384 S.E.2d at 667; see also Walls v. State, 204 Ga. App. 348, 419 S.E.2d
344 (1992); Adams v. Moffatt, 204 Ga. App. 314, 419 S.E.2d 318 (1992). But see Oran v.
Canada Life Assurance Co., 194 Ga. App. 518, 390 S.E.2d 879 (1990).
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1987, the evidence for it is inconclusive. Section 5-6-35 does provide, as
the supreme court has observed, that "[aippeals in the following cases
shall be taken as provided in this Code section,"'' while the direct appeals procedure provides that "[a]ppeals may be taken. . . from the following judgments and rulings .

. . ."

The Appellate Practice Act also

provides, however, that "this article shall be liberally construed so as to
bring about a decision on the merits of every case appealed,"', and that
when a direct appeal is properly before the appellate court, other deci'
These conflicting imperasions of the trial court "shall be reviewed.""
have been resolved
should
be
reconciled,
they
can
that
the
extent
tives, to
Appellate Practice
of
the
in Yancey in favor of the latter, declared intent
9
Act' " to secure a determination on the merits of the case, including those
aspects of the case otherwise subject to the discretionary appeals
procedure.
The process begun in Kalb and Klein, and most recently appearing in
Yancey, Stancil, and McClure, can and should result in a workable set of
principles: the most critical and immediate need, whether met by legislative action or judicial decisions, is that the courts dismiss as few appeals
as is consistent with the proper interpretation of the direct, interlocutory,
and discretionary appeal provisions.199 In the long term, the General Assembly needs to provide a solution to the Gordian knot presented by
these decisions, although even then this area is likely to remain difficult
to unravel. Among other things, the two appellate courts may wish to
have the power to treat a direct appeal under section 5-6-34(a) as a discretionary application under section 5-6-35, and vice versa,2 " just as the
194. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
195. Id. § 5-6-34(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
196. Id. § 5-6-30 (emphasis added).
197. Id. § 5-6-34(c); see, e.g., id. § 5-6-35(a).
198. See Smith v. Cofer, 243 Ga. 530, 255 S.E.2d 49 (1979); see also Erwin v. Moore, 15
Ga. 361 (1854); Roberts v. State, 4 Ga. App. 207, 60 S.E. 1082 (1908).
199. The supreme court's direction in Yancey is unclear, and several possibilities appear.
The court may overrule either Yancey on the one hand or the conflicting decisions on the
other. Otherwise, Haggard and Stancil will apply to a combined appeal from a simple judgment, Klein and McClure to a cross-appeal, and the contrary rule of Yancey when a resetting post-judgment motion has been filed, with its effect uncertain on a cross-appeal when
another party has filed the resetting motion. None of this procedure is set out with any
specificity, still less with any clarity, in the statute, nor, at this point, -in the courts'
decisions.
200. See Akins v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of America, 197 Ga. App. 574, 399 S.E.2d 584
(1990). But see Cumbess v. State, 241 Ga. 421, 246 S.E.2d 186 (1978) (appeal from county
court conviction properly treated as cert. petition).
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the transGeneral Assembly has liberalized appellate procedure to permit
201
fer of an appeal filed in the wrong Georgia appellate court.
V. THE "RESETTING" POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS
A. Identifying the Resetting Motions
It is useful to consider the provisions of section 5-6-38(a) in their entirety when addressing the effect of post-judgment motions on the time
for appeal:
A notice of appeal, shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of; but when a motion for new
trial, a motion in arrest of judgment, or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict has been filed, the notice shall be filed within 30
days after entry of the order granting, overruling, or otherwise finally
disposing of the motion.202

Although many decisions refer to a tolling effect, the motions listed in
section 5-6-38(a) actually cause the thirty-day period to begin running
anew, so the term "resetting" is more accurate and, therefore, preferable.
Not all post-judgment motions are resetting motions, as the language of
section 5-6-38(a) makes clear.2 3 Further, the court will treat a motion
according to its substance, not its form or caption.204 Thus a motion
styled as one for a new trial will not reset the time when that motion is
not the proper vehicle for addressing the trial court's earlier action.2 05 A
motion for reconsideration of an earlier order is not one of the motions
listed, and has no effect on the time for appeal.20 s Likewise, a motion to
vacate, modify, or amend a prior order has no effect on the time.20 An
extraordinary motion for new trial has no effect on the timing of an ap-

201. GA. SUP CT. R. 23, 25(b); GA. CT. App. R. 21(b), (c); see McClure v. Gower, 259 Ga.
678, 385 S.E.2d 271 (1990); Griffin v. Johnson, 157 Ga. App. 657, 278 S.E.2d 422 (1981).
202. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38(a) (1982); see also id. § 5-6-35(d).
203. Attorneys accustomed to federal practice will find the rule 52(b) motion for additional findings is available under section 9-11-52(c) but does not reset the time, and the rule
59 motion to alter or amend the judgment does not exist as such, in Georgia practice.
204. E.g,, Pillow v. Seymour, 255 Ga. 683, 341 S.E.2d 447 (1986); Parker v. BellamyLunda-Dawson, 190 Ga. App. 257, 378 S.E.2d 502 (1989).
205. Trinity v. Applebee's Neighborhood Grill & Bar, 201 Ga. App. 404, 411 S.E.2d 131
(1991).
206. O'Neal v. Winn-Dixie, Inc., 195 Ga. App. 409, 393 S.E.2d 473 (1990); see Tommy
Day Wilcox, Appellate Practiceand Procedure,34 MERcER L. REv. 3 (1982).
207. American Flat Glass Distrib., Inc. v. Michael, 260 Ga. 312, 392 S.E.2d 855 (1990);
Mathis v. Hegwood, 169 Ga. App. 547, 314 S.E.2d 122 (1984).
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peal from the original judgment
when it is filed more than thirty days
08
2
after the entry of judgment.

B. The Timing of a Resetting Motion
A resetting motion must be timely to have any effect on the running of
the time for appeal. A motion in arrest of judgment in a criminal case
must be filed within the term the court*entered the judgment.2 0 The supreme court held in Johnson v. State"0 that a purported motion for new
trial not filed within thirty days as required by section 5-5-40 was void
and, therefore, did not affect the time for appeal. 1 1 Of particular importance in civil cases for addressing timeliness of the motion is section 9-1152(b) of the Civil Practice Act,212 which provides that a motion for
amended or additional findings must be made within twenty days after
entry of judgment, and when accompanied by a motion for new trial,
"both motions shall be made within 20 days after entry of judgment. 21 s
Post-judgment motions that have been amended, or filed in the alternative, also bear special scrutiny. For example, parties frequently file a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") or, in the alternative, a new trial.2 14 A party may amend a motion for new trial to add
additional grounds under section 5-5-40(b), 215 but may not amend more
than thirty days after the entry of judgment to add a motion for JNOV
under section 9-11-50(b).21 Such an untimely amendment does not affect
the time for appeal.21 7 The case can be anticipated, however, and indeed
has occurred, in which the trial court rules on the two motions or two
aspects of the same motion separately and 2 creates
uncertainty about
18
when a party should file the notice of appeal.
208. Kindle v. State, 181 Ga. App. 52, 351 S.E.2d 461 (1986); see O.C.G.A. § 5-5-41

(1982).
209. O.C.G.A. § 17-9-61(b) (1982).
210. 227 Ga. 219, 180 S.E.2d 94 (1971).
211. Id, at 219, 180 S.E.2d at 94; accord Smith v. Forrester, 145 Ga. App. 281, 243 S.E.2d

575 (1978).
212. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-52(b) (1982 & Supp. 1992).
213. Id. § 9-11-52(c).
214. Id. § 9-11-50(b).
215. Id. § 5-5-40(b) (1982).
216. Id. § 9-11-50(b) (1982 & Supp. 1992); see Preferred Risk Ins. Co. v. Boykin, 174 Ga.
App. 269, 329 S.E.2d 900 (1985).
217. Leader Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Martin, 185 Ga. App. 27, 29, 363 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1987).
218. LeGallienne v. State, 180 Ga. App. 108, 110, 348 S.E.2d 471, 474 (1986); Pirkle v.
Triplett, 153 Ga. App. 524, 525, 265 S.E.2d 854, 855 (1980). If one of the motions has not
been ruled on, the appellate court may remand the case with directions to enter a ruling.
National Bank of Ga. v. Refrigerated Transport Co., 143 Ga. App. 661, 662, 239 S.E.2d 551,
551 (1977).
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Georgia courts have more strictly construed the timing of a post-judgment motion than that of the notice of appeal, resulting in an anomaly in
the textual interpretation of the Appellate Practice Act. Section 5-5-40,
governing motions for new trial, provides that: "All motions for new trial,

except in extraordinary cases, shall be made within 30 days of the entry
of the judgment on the verdict or entry of the judgment where the case
was tried without a jury."' 19 In Moore v. Moore,220 the supreme court held
that a prematurely filed motion for new trial is void, and thus neither
22
properly before the trial court nor effective to reset the time for appeal.
The court of appeals similarly refused to extend Gillen
to permit a pre2
Powell.
v.
Deroller
in
trial,
new
for
motion
mature
These holdings concern a problematic construction of the statute because the language of section 5-5-40, requiring a motion for new trial
"within 30 days of" the entry of judgment, is broader than the language
of section 5-6-38(a), interpreted as permitting a premature notice "within
30 days after. ' " 8 Contrary to Gillen, the court did not apply the principle
of liberal construction at all in Moore or Deroller when it would have
been consistent with the broader language. The reasons for this, whether
a matter of policy or of statutory
construction, are not addressed by those
22
or any similar decisiois '
C. The Reason Behind the Resetting Rule
The decisions in civil cases disclose three primary concerns that have
shaped the Georgia courts' thinking about the timing of appeals after
post-judgment motions: the first, philosophical; the second, theoretical;
and the'third, entirely practical. The courts have discussed these concerns most fully in connection with the motion for new trial, probably
because that motion, unlike the motion for JNOV, raises matters peculiarly within the trial court's discretion. Since- all three motions reset the
time under section 5-6-38(a), however, the resulting policies affect all
three alike.
219. O.C.G.A. § 5-5-40(a) (1982) (as amended).
220. 229 Ga. 600, 193 S.E.2d 608 (1972).
221. Id. at 601, 193 S.E.2d at 609.
222. 144 Ga. App. 585, 586-87, 241 'S.E.2d 469, 471 (1978); accord Wall v. C & S Bank,
153 Ga. App. 29, 264 S.E.2d 523 (1980), affd, 247 Ga. 216, 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981), overruled
by McKeever v. State, 189 Ga. App. 445, 375 S.E.2d 899 (1988). Wall was unusual in that
although the premature motion did not reset the time, no judgment was entered until after
the appeal had been filed, so the case fell within the Gillen rule on premature notices of
appeal.
223. Gillen v. Bostick, 234 Ga. 308, 311, 215 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1975).
224. One reason for requiring post-judgment rather than post-trial motions is that such
a rule eliminates the question whether a later-entered judgment is an implicit denial of the
motion.
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The first concern arises generally from the Georgia trial courts' historical role with respect to judgments, and more specifically from the nature
of the motions for new trial and for JNOV. The Georgia appellate courts
traditionally have afforded considerable deference to the trial court's control and review of its own judgments during the post-trial stages of a case.
As a matter of Georgia common law, which in this respect is unaffected
by the Civil Practice Act, 2 5 the trial court is afforded plenary control
over its nonjury judgments during a term of court, 26 and may modify,
amend, or vacate them in the exercise of its informed discretion.2 7 This
plenary control has been described as a duty of the trial court that exists
"apart from and independent of" appellate review. 28 By statute the trial
court may grant a new trial on its own motion within thirty days of the
entry of judgment.2 2 This authority is found under section 5-5-40(h)2s0
and the statutory provision that "[the superior . . . courts shall have
power to correct errors and grant new trials in cases or collateral issues
*

. . in such manner and under such rules as they may establish according

2 '1
to law and the usages and customs of courts.
As when the triil judge acts sua sponte to reopen a judgment or to set
aside a jury verdict, the motion for a new trial invokes "the mind and
conscience" of the court to see that justice is done and fairness observed.22 2 The motion for new trial was originally an extension of the trial
court's power to act within the term of court, to permit a ruling in vacation on a timely motion.233 The modern provisions of section 5-5-40(a)
extend the time for filing the motion to thirty days, to prevent the losing
party's "being deprived of his right to file a motion for new trial by an
adUlournment of the term of court."2' 3 ' The resetting provisions of the

225. Ammons v. Bolick, 233 Ga. 324, 210 S.E.2d 796 (1974).
226. Pittard Mach. Co. v. Eisele Corp., 166 Ga. App. 324, 325, 304 S.E.2d 129, 130 (1983)
(motion filed outside the term insufficient).
227. Martin v. General Motors Corp., 226 Ga. 860, 178 S.E.2d 183 (1970); Latimer v.
Sweat, 125 Ga. 475, 477, 54 S.E.2d 673, 674 (1906); Walton v. Jones, 53 Ga. 91 (1874).
228. Brown v. Service Coach Lines, 71 Ga. App. 437, 444, 31 S.E.2d 236, 241 (1944).
229. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Hearn, 188 Ga. App. 277, 278-79, 372 S.E.2d 834, 836 (1988).
230.' O.C.G.A. § 5-5-40(h) (1982).
231. Id. § 5-5-1(a); see GA. CONST. art. VI, § 1, para. 4. This authority did not exist at
common law. Hulsey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 138 Ga. App. 523, 525, 226 S.E.2d 791, 792
(1976); see McDonald v. Wimpy, 203 Ga. 498, 46 S.E.2d 906 (1948).
232. Housing Auth. v. Geter, 252 Ga. 196, 197, 312 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1984); Brown v.
Service Coach Lines, 71 Ga. App. 437, 443, 31 S.E.2d 236, 240 (1944).
233. See GA. CoDE § 3643 (1861); see also Durrence v. Cowart, 160 Ga. 671, 129 S.E. 26
(1925) (permitting a prejudgment motion for new trial, under former term-of-court statute).
Later decisions hold that the term-of-court power to order a new trial is limited by the 30
day period set out in O.C.G.A. § 5-5-40. See Hulsey, 138 Ga. App. at 523, 226 S.E.2d at 791.
234. Charles J. Bloch, How to Preparean Amended Motion for a New Trial, 21 GA. ST.
B.J. 424, 425 (1959).
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Appellate Practice Act are thus consistent with historical practice in delaying an appeal while the trial court reviews the verdict and judgment.
The second and third policies underlying the post-judgment motions
practice both stem from the relationship of the trial and appellate courts,
and are at once more theoretical and more practical than the philosophical concept of the trial court's relationship to its judgments. The Georgia
courts have consistently held that, as a matter of appellate theory, the
trial and appellate courts may not simultaneously exercise jurisdiction
over the merits of a judgment. Thus, in Walker v. Walker,32 5 the supreme
court held that, since the notice of appeal serves as a supersedeas under
section 5-6-46(a),'2 3 it "deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to take fur' 237
ther proceedings toward the enforcement of the judgment superseded.
Practically speaking, even if it was theoretically acceptable, the simultaneous exercise of jurisdiction by two courts would, and usually does,
create confusing, difficult, and often expensive logistical problems for the
parties and the clerks' offices in handling the official record and transcript. The motions for new trial, in arrest of judgment, and for JNOV
require the trial court, in most cases, to have direct access to the entire
record, and so require an exception to the rule that the timely filing of a
notice of appeal from an appealable order or judgment ousts the trial
court of its jurisdiction2 8
D. Appeals from Motions to Set Aside Judgment
The provisions of the Civil Practice Act relating to the motion to set
aside a judgment have been a source of some confusion regarding the
time for taking an appeal. Section 9-11-:60(d) provides that "[a] motion to
set aside must be predicated upon some nonamendable defect which does
appear upon the face of the record or pleadings, unless the defect involves
a jurisdictional error .

.

"..,

Clearly the motion must be in substance

one attacking a nonamendable or jurisdictional defect, and a motion to
reconsider styled as one to set aside is insufficient.2 40 Problems arise with
the use of the term "'discretionary' motion to set aside" to describe a
motion for reconsideration, which is likely to confuse at least one litigant
before its meaning is either clarified or, preferably, its use abandoned.241
,
Beyond that, the Georgia courts have been inconsistent in their approach
235.
236.
237.
238.
65, 66,
239.
240.
241.

239 Ga. 175, 236 S.E.2d 263 (1977).
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-46(a) (1982).
239 Ga. at 175, 236 S.E.2d at 264.
Tyree v. Jackson, 226 Ga. 642, 177 S.E.2d 159 (1970); Campbell v. Gormley, 185 Ga.
194 S.E. 177, 178 (1937).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d) (1982).
E.g., Perryman v. Georgia Power Co., 180 Ga. App. 259, 348 S.E.2d 762 (1986).
See Stone v. Dawkins, 192 Ga. App. 126, 126, 384 S.E.2d 225, 226 (1989).
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to the effect of a rule 9-11-60(d) motion to set aside on the time for
appeal.
The supreme court held in Johnson v. Barnes"2' that a motion to set
aside is "at least one motion not enumerated in [O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38(a)]
*...
1213 The decision does
which is itself, when overruled, appealable .
not specify under which provision of section 5-6-34(a) such an appeal lies;
presumably it is a final order, in that after disposition of the motion "the
case is no longer pending in the court below.' '2 " From the authorities
cited in Johnson it is clear the court treated the denial of a motion to set
aside as directly appealable."15 Some of the court's discussion, however,
has led some litigants, 24 6 as well as some court of appeals decisions, to
conclude that a motion to set aside does affect the running of the time for
appeal from the original judgment.
Most court of appeals decisions have treated the appeal from an order
denying a motion to set aside as directly appealable.2 47 In Dutton v.
Dykes,2" for example, the court observed, citing Johnson, that
"[a)lthough the denial of a motion to set aside is final and appealable
. .. , such a motion is not one which will automatically extend the time
for filing notice of appeal on the underlying judgment. ' 2 4 0 Recent decisions such as Law Offices of Johnston & Robinson v. Fortson" have
.stated to the contrary that a motion to set aside will extend the time for
appeal from the underlying judgment.2 1 The courts probably grounded
these latter holdings in the theory that all direct appeals, ultimately, are
appeals bearing on the final judgment, but they had the untoward effect
of suggesting that some motions other than those listed in section 5-638(a) can affect the time for appeal. That approach, as sound as its major
premise may be, finds no support in the statute because a motion to set

242. 237 Ga. 502, 229 S.E.2d 70 (1976).
243. Id. at 503-04, 229 S.E.2d at 72.
244. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1992).
245. Mayson v. Malone, 122 Ga. App. 814, 178 S.E.2d 806 (1970).
246. Dougherty County v. Burt, 168 Ga. App. 166, 167, 170, 308 S.E.2d 395, 396, 398
(1983).
247. Mathis v. Hegwood, 169 Ga. App. 547, 314 S.E.2d 122 (1984).
248. 159 Ga. App. 48, 283 S.E.2d 28 (1981).
249. Id. at 49, 283 S.E.2d at 29.
250. 175 Ga. App. 706, 334 S.E.2d 33 (1985). The court in Fortson described the posttrial motions as "motions in arrest of judgment." In fact, however, the motion in arrest of

judgment was eliminated in 1966 in cases governed by the Civil Practice Act. Johnson v.
Barnes, 237 Ga. 502, 503 n.1, 229 S.E.2d 70, 72 n.1 (1976); see 1966 Ga. Laws 609, 691, §

135(jj). Historically, language referring to a motion in arrest was not removed from O.C.G.A.
§ 9-12-15 (1982 & Supp. 1992), which governed and continues to apply to a motion to set
aside, until technical amendments were enacted in 1984. 1984 Ga. Laws 22, § 9.
251. 175 Ga. App. at 707, 334 S.E.2d at 35.
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aside is not enumerated as resetting, extending, or otherwise affecting the
time for appeal from a final judgment.
VI.

PRINCIPLES

OF

TIMING ArrER POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS

A myriad of circumstances affect the transfer of jurisdiction accomplished by the filing of a notice of appeal: (1) the time of filing the notice;
(2) the status of the trial court's final orders; (3) the posture of other
parties and claims; (4) the presence or later filing of any post-judgment
motions; (5) the nature of those motions; and (6) any combinations in
which multiple motions may be pending.2 2 The result of applying a simple statute to these varying circumstances is an area of law that is increasingly complex and arcane. Despite the courts' considerable efforts,
the statute remains in need of remedial legislation to correct theoretical
and practical problems with the statute's application.
A.

The Resetting of Time by Order or Withdrawal of Motion

Section 5-6-38(a) resets the time for appeal upon "the entry of the or25' 3
der granting, overruling, or otherwise finally disposing of the motion.
In a perfect world, the process would work as it did in Ailion v. Wade,25'
in which appellants filed a written request for an order permitting withdrawal of their motion for new trial and then filed a notice of appeal
within thirty days after entry of that order. The court of appeals applied
section 5-6-38(a) as it was written to the order "otherwise finally disposing" of the motion and held that the appeal was timely.2 5
Little difficulty arises when a post-judgment motion is simply granted
or denied, but suppose the motion is simply withdrawn? The statutory
language seemingly contemplates an order of court, since "otherwise disposing" modifies "order" and does not appear to leave room for another
means of disposition. But it does not require an order. The supreme court
has not faced this issue, and the court of appeals has rendered decisions
that, although certainly defensible individually, proceed from contrary
first principles and lead to contrary results.
In Allen v. Rome Kraft Co.,"' the court of appeals observed that "the
effect of the filing of the motion [for new trial] is to toll the time for filing
the appeal. . . until the motion for new trial is overruled (unless appel252. Most simply, a notice of appeal filed more than 30 days after the entry of an order
denying a motion for new trial is untimely. Baker v. State, 195 Ga. App. 424, 394 S.E.2d 801
(1990).
253. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38(a) (1982 & Supp. 1992).
254. 190 Ga. App. 151, 378 S.E.2d 507 (1989).
255. Id. at 154, 378 S.E.2d at 509.
256. 114 Ga. App. 717, 152 S.E.2d 618 (1966).
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lant should elect to abandon or dismiss the motion)." 257 The court did not
expressly indicate whether an appeal filed after withdrawal and more
than thirty days after judgment would be timely, and the reference to an
appellant who had abandoned or dismissed the motion is arguably
ambiguous.

215

The decision in Golden v. Credico, Inc.25 suggests that a withdrawal
resets the time for appeal, although the court decided the case on another
ground.2" The decision states that "[a] motion for new trial can be disposed of in four ways: (1) overruled, (2) granted, (3) dismissed, or (4)
withdrawn by movant. The words 'otherwise finally disposed of' can mean
only a dismissal or a withdrawal of the motion. '" 1 The majority held that
a letter from the trial judge to the movant physically returning a motion
for new trial and stating that it was "no good," which letter was, subsequently date-stamped and filed with the clerk, was not an order "otherwise finally disposing" of the motion and that the notice of appeal was
2
premature and subject to dismissal

11

It would be reasonable to anticipate, perhaps after Allen and certainly
after Golden, a later holding that a prior withdrawal of the post-judgment
motion triggers the resetting provision of section 5-6-38(a) and that a notice of appeal filed within thirty days thereafter would be timely. In
Golden the court expressly stated that it was outlining the means by
which a motion may be "'otherwise finally disposed of,'" and that those
means included "a dismissal or a withdrawal." 2

3

As a practical matter,

the use of a simple withdrawal is a predictable and salutary response for
an attorney who does not want to trouble the trial court for a dispositive
order permitting withdrawal. Permitting such a withdrawal would eliminate a potential source of delay and expense in the appellate process. It is
nevertheless true that one must defend the dicta in these cases on policy
grounds, since the statutory language provides no explicit support.
Section 5-6-38(a) arguably resets the time for appeal only when the
proper combination of certain post-judgment motions and a dispositive
order occurs. The court of appeals so held in Taylor v. State,24 applying
the literal language of section 5-6-38(a) to a criminal case in which the
defendant voluntarily withdrew his motion for new trial. The court dis257. Id. at 718, 152 S.E.2d at 620.
258. Id.
259. 124 Ga. App. 700, 185 S.E.2d 578 (1971).
260. Id. at 701, 185 S.E.2d at 597.
261. Id.
262. Id. The dissent argued that the trial judge's letter was an order in substance if not
in form, and should have been treated as a dispositive order under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38(a)
(1982 & Supp. 1992). 124 Ga. App. at 701-02, 185 S.E.2d at 580.
263. 124 Ga. App. at 701, 185 S.E.2d at 579 (emphasis added).
264. 173 Ga. App. 745, 327 S.E.2d 860 (1985).

50
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missed the appeal, stating that "[als defendant voluntarily abandoned his
motion for new trial and there is no order of the court disposing of the
motion nor any order granting an extension of time or a delayed appeal,
beyond the 30 days permitted after entry of the
there is no'26 extension
5
judgment.

The court's retroactive elimination of seventy-one days from defendant's timetable brings to mind the ten days lost to sixteenth-century
Europeans caught in the time warp of the Gregorian calendar, and it
probably was just as dismaying to'those affected by it."' Certainly, like
that earlier return to the natural order of things, the decision is supportable by reference to the literal language of section 5-6-38(a), and it has
some attraction as a matter of policy since it would prevent one party
from filing a motion for new trial in order to buy time for an appeal. The
decision is not, however, consistent with the policy-oriented dicta in Allen
and Golden, nor can it be satisfactorily reconciled with the result and
analysis of the later decision in Booker v.Amdur.'"
In Booker the court of appeals addressed the case in which the movant
'who withdraws the motion for new trial is not the appellant, but is another party to the action.2 " The court applied the dicta in Golden to hold
that "the withdrawal or dismissal of the motion for new trial by the party
who filed it is considered a disposition of the motion pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38(a), so as to commence the running of the 30-day period
for filing an appeal." '2" Since the appellant did not file a new notice of
appeal as contemplated by that section, the court dismissed the earlier
270

appeal.

The inconsistent treatment of appeals after withdrawn motions occurs
because the decisions in Booker and Golden are based on a policy analysis while the decision in Taylor relies on the language of the statute. In
procedural terms, Booker and Golden require only a filing and a disposition (order or withdrawal), whereas Taylor requires a filing and a dispositive order. The decision in Booker offers a more satisfactory procedure, if
only because it is grounded in the earlier principles of Allen and Golden,
265. Id. at 745, 327 S.E.2d at 860.
266. In 1582, Pope Gregory XIII ordained the ten-day period from March 11 to March
21, 1582, be dropped from the calendar in order to restore the vernal equinox to March 21,
from which it had been displaced by an error in the Julian calendar. See COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 127 (Concise ed. 1983); WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 998
(Unabr. ed. 1961). It surely is an accident that the date of the judgment in Taylor, March
15, fell within the ten lost days (albeit some 400 years later).
267. 186 Ga. App. 276, 367 S.E.2d 94 (1988).
268. Id. at 276, 367 S.E.2d at 94. The author was one of the counsel of record for the

plaintiffs-appellees in the case.
269.
270.

Id.; see Denson v. Kloack, 177 Ga. App. 483, 339 S.E.2d 761 (1986).
186 Ga. App. at 276, 367 S.E.2d at 95.
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and covers a procedural situation that is likely to occur and indeed should
be encouraged. Ultimately, whether either decision is right or wrong, the
practical and analytical problems they raise highlight the need for a statutory amendment to cover the case in which a post-judgment motion is
withdrawn.
B.

The Resetting of Time After an Interlocutory Appeal

The Crumbley Decision. An interesting case concerning section 911-54(b)'s multi-party finality and section 5-6-38(a)'s final disposition of a
post-judgment motion is Crumbley v. Wyant.71 Prior to a direct appeal
from final judgment, the defendant hospital obtained'interlocutory review
of the grant of a new trial, which was reversed. The question of the time
for appeal arose after remand when plaintiffs-appellants took a direct appeal from the final judgment on the adverse jury verdict. ' 7 2 The court of

appeals held that the notice in the later appeal was timely, because it was
not until the supreme court had denied an application for writ of certiorari that "there was a final concurrence of a judgment in favor of both
appellees and a' 2 denial of appellants' motion for a new trial as against
both appellees. "

7

What the court of appeals meant by a "final concurrence" is not entirely clear, since no such event is defined by the statute. If the court
intended "final concurrence" to refer to the state of affairs existing at the
moment of the supreme court's decision, then Crumbley is a decision of
some importance and potential danger. The better interpretation of the
"final concurrence" language may be that the court intended it as a shorthand description of several events in the appellate process, prescribed by
statute, that must occur before an appellate decision has any practical
significance for the parties.
After Crumbley, the appellate practitioner should be aware of three
possible "triggering events" in the unlikely event of an immediate appeal
after remand from an interlocutory appeal: (1) the possible but unlikely
rule that the date of the appellate ruling controls; (2) the more likely rule
that the filing of the remittitur with the clerk of the trial court controls;
and (3) the preferable rule that the trial court's entry of a judgment after
27

remand controls.

4

271. 183 Ga. App. 802, 360 S.E.2d 276 (1987), appeal after remand, 188 Ga. App. 227,
372 S.E.2d 497 (1988).
272. 183 Ga. App. at 803, 360 S.E.2d at 277.
273. Id. at 806, 360 S.E.2d at 280.
274. The applicable principles, at least in part, are contained in these cases and statutes:
Chambers v. State, 262 Ga. 200, 415 S.E.2d 643 (1992); Huff v. McLarty, 241 Ga. 442, 246
S.E.2d 302 (1978); Hagan v. Robert & Co. Assocs., 222 Ga. 469, 150 S.E.2d 663 (1966); Lyon
v. Lyon, 103 Ga. 747, 30 S.E. 575 (1898); Brown v. Wilson, 59 Ga. 605 (1877); State v. Stew-
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Unfortunately, when parties take interlocutory appeals in multipleparty cases, the potential for uncertainty is simply enormous. It is not
hard to imagine a multi-defendant, civil fraud. or racketeering case in
which the court grants section 9-11-54(b) judgments to some defendants,
an interlocutory appeal under section 5-6-34(b) to others, and- denies a
motion for new trial or JNOV for those defendants, but grants the motions of others who settle during the pendency of the interlocutory appeal, to complicate the procedural posture almost beyond recognition.
The best response for the would-be appellant is to watch the running of
time very closely to see that remittuturs, judgments; notices, applications,
and the like are properly entered and, in general, to prepare for the worst.
C. The Requirement of Filing the Notice of Appeal Within Thirty
Days After the Dispositive Order on a Post-Judgment Motion
The provision of section 5-6-38(a) that a notice of appeal after a postjudgment motion must be filed "within 30 days after the entry of the
order . . . finally disposing of the motion" is grammatically identical to
the provision that a notice of appeal from a simple judgment must be
filed "within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment
complained of ..

. .""

The courts have interpreted the two provisions

differently, however, and a further differentiation has appeared in the
post-judgment-motion context between civil cases, in which the appellate
courts have required the filing of a new notice after disposition of a postjudgment-motion, and criminal cases, in which the courts have applied a
variant of the Gillen premature notice rule and did not require a new
notice. The direction of the decisions is not entirely clear, and although
the courts' efforts to fashion a workable set of rules has been largely successful, the costs in dismissed appeals have been significant. A statutory
amendment that reflects on its face what the courts are doing and, to
some extent, what they should be doing, would greatly assist practicing
attorneys in filing a timely notice of appeal.
The Rule in Civil Cases. Historically, the courts have treated a notice of appeal filed in a civil case during the pendency of a post-judgment
motion listed in section 5-6-38(a) as premature and subject to dismissal.
In Smith v. Smith,2 7 6 appellant filed a notice of appeal before the trial
court ruled on the motion for new trial. The court of appeals held that
"[aln appeal from the judgment on the verdict brought while the case is
art, 197 Ga. App. 269, 398 S.E.2d 270 (1990); O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-8, -9(a), -10, -12, -14, 9-13-1
(1982). See Giordano v. Stubbs, 356 F. Supp. 1041, 1042-45 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 483 F.2d 1395
(5th Cir. 1973).
275., O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38(a) (1982).
276. 128 Ga. App. 29, 195 S.E.2d 269 (1973).
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pending on motion for new trial is premature and will be dismissed. 277
The court decided Smith at a time when Gibson v. Hodges27 8 which prevented a premature notice of appeal*from a simple judgment, was still
good law. Although Gillen later permitted a premature notice, 7 that decision does not appear to have affected the contrary rule in the post-judg80
2
ment-motion context.

The Georgia courts have adopted a special, nonstatutory procedure
that allows the trial court to rule on a post-judgment motion filed after a
notice of appeal has, in theory, divested the trial court of its jurisdiction
over the case. In Housing Authority of Atlanta v. Geter,21 plaintiff appealed, and defendant later filed a timely cross-appeal and motion for
new trial. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment, but the trial court
granted a new trial after receiving the remittitur. The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals grant of a writ of prohibition, holding that
"[t]he fact that the case has made its way through the appeal processes of
the court of appeals has effectively cut off the Housing Authority's right
to pursue its motion for a new trial."82
The supreme court then prescribed a procedure for future cases intended to protect "[t]he right of the trial court to correct its own errors
.. '..
M83 Upon the filing of a notice of appeal, the movant may preserve
the trial court's jurisdiction over a subsequent motion for new trial by
moving in the appellate court for a stay of the direct appeal.2 8' The supreme court held that the divestiture of jurisdiction "does not become
effective during the period in which a motion for new trial may be
filed,"' 2 namely, during the first thirty days following the entry of the
original judgment." The same rule applies when the trial court grants a
new trial on its own motion under section 5-5-40(h), since the trial court
277. Id. at 30, 195 S.E.2d at 270.
278. 221 Ga. 779, 147 S.E.2d 329 (1966).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 36-46.
280. The court in Gillen expressly overruled four prior decisions and "other cases with
similar holdings." 234 Ga. at 310, 215 S.E.2d at 678. The overruling language is vague, but
there is no indication that it was intended to sweep more broadly than the case of an appeal
from a simple judgment.
281. 252 Ga. 196, 312 S.E.2d 309 (1984) (overruling Tidwell Homes, Inc. v. Sharif, 164
Ga. App. 284, 297 S.E.2d 67 (1982), disapproved on subsequent appeal, Sharif v. Tidwell

Homes, Inc., 252 Ga. 205, 312 S.E.2d 114 (1984)).
282.

Id. at 196-97, 312 S.E.2d at 310-11.

283. Id.at 197, 312 S.E.2d at 310.
284. Id., 312 S.E.2d at 311. The court of appeals has consistently held that the question
of appellate jurisdiction is to 6e decided by the appellate court, not by the trial court, for

most purposes. Williams v. Natalie Townhouses of Inman Park Condominium Ass'n, 182
Ga. App. 815, 357 S.E.2d 156 (1987).

285.

252 Ga. at 197, 312 S.E.2d at 311.

286.

O.C.G.A. § 5-5-40(a) (1982); see id. § 5-6-39(b),
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may do so "even though a notice of appeal has been filed. ' ' 7 If a subsequent resetting motion is filed along with a motion for stay in the appellate court, "the effectiveness of the divestiture of jurisdiction is then
delayed until the motion for new trial is ruled upon and a notice of appeal to the ruling has been filed or the period for appealing the ruling
has expired."2 s The court reasoned that the requirement of a new notice
of appeal would serve "to protect the integrity of the trial courts in their
efforts to do substantial justice and discourage races to the courthouse for
the purpose of playing legal slapjack with notices and motions."28 9
The court of appeals decision in Rich v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Co. 2 9 0 is to the same effect. The court in Rich relied on Geter

and its own intervening decision in Atkinson v.State" I to hold, when the
trial court had not ruled on a motion for new trial filed after the notice of
appeal, that "we have jurisdiction over appellant's direct appeal from the
judgment entered by the trial court because no motion for a stay of the
direct appeal has been filed. 2 92 Thus, the motion for stay has become an
essential part of post-judgment practice in the trial court when a reset93
ting post-judgment motion is filed after the filing of a notice of appeal.2
The Geter stay procedure works reasonably well so long as a motion for
stay is actually filed in the appellate court. However, whether from the
movant's being indifferent to an appellate stay or unaware of its availability, a motion for stay is not always filed. It may be that an express statutory provision for the motion to stay, perhaps as a component of the procedures for the three resetting motions, would heighten the practicing
bar's awareness of the procedure and increase its frequency of use.
Filing the notice of appeal and either the post-judgment motion or the
dispositive order on the same day presents special questions. In Strauss
v.Peachtree Associates, Ltd.,2 94 the court of appeals held that when the
notice of appeal and the post-judgment motion are filed on the same day,
the notice of appeal is premature and subject to dismissal.2 95 On the other
287. 252 Ga. at 197, 312 S.E.2d at 311.
288. Id. (emphasis added).
289. Id. (emphasis added). The dissent would have given effect to the trial court's juris-

diction over a subsequently filed motion for new trial, as against the notice of appeal, so
long as
290.
291.
292.
293.

the motion was timely. id. at 198, 312 S.E.2d at 311 (Weltner, J., dissenting).
176 Ga. App. 663, 337 S.E.2d 370 (1985).
170 Ga. App. 260, 316 S.E.2d 592 (1984); see infra text accompanying notes 315-27.
176 Ga. App. at 663, 337 S.E.2d at 371.
The attorney in the trial court may need to explain this procedure to the trial court,

whose response otherwise is likely to be that the notice of appeal divests it of jurisdiction.
See Watkins v. M & M Clays, Inc., 199 Ga. App. 54, 404 S.E.2d 141 (1991).

294. 156 Ga. App. 536, 275 S.E.2d 90 (1980).
295. Id. at 536, 275 S.E.2d at 90.
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hand, in Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Strickland,1"9 the court held that a
notice of appeal is timely when it is filed on the same day as the entry of
the trial court's dispositive order on a post-judgment motion."' The difference between these cases can be readily explained, since the motion
begins the trial court's post-judgment work and should not be superseded
by a notice, whereas the order completes that work and there is nothing
prohibiting the filing of the notice on the same day.
The Rule in Criminal Cases. The first decision under the Appellate
Practice Act on appeals in connection with post-judgment motions was
the criminal case of Kurtz v. State.1"u In Kurtz defendant filed both a
notice of appeal and a motion for new trial on the same day, and the
court of appeals held the notice of appeal premature and subject to dismissal.2 9 9 In State v. Rimes,300 a 1986 decision, the court of appeals held
that a notice of appeal filed by the state during the pendency of a motion
for new trial was "premature and . . .of no effect," and "[t]he subsequent denial of the motion for new trial does not perfect the defective
notice of appeal. 3 0 1 Less than a week later, in Boothe v.State,30 2 the
court reaffirmed the rule that a criminal defendant's premature notice of
appeal will
be dismissed, when it is filed while a resetting motion is
03
pending.
All of this changed only a few weeks later when the court evaluated a
notice of appeal filed during the pendency of a post-judgment motion in
LeGallienne v.State.30" The court held that the criminal defendant's notice of appeal was timely, relying upon the rule of Gillen v. Bostick$0 5 that
a notice of appeal is timely when filed between the entry of a dispositive
order and the entry of judgment on that order.3 "e
The court of appeals followed LeGallienne in 1987 with the en banc
decisions of Sharp v. State 0 7 and Eller v. State.309 In Sharp the en banc
court held it had jurisdiction over a notice of appeal from the oral denial
296. 185 Ga. App. 306, 363 S.E.2d 834 (1987).
297. Id. at 307-08, 363 S.E.2d at 835.
298. 115 Ga. App. 665, 155 S.E.2d 735 (1967).
299. Id. at 665, 155 S.E.2d at 735. The court considered adopting a presumption that the
notice of appeal had been filed first, but rejected that alternative. Id. at 665-66, 155 S.E.2d
at 736.
300. 177 Ga. App. 872, 341 S.E.2d 710 (1986).
301. Id. at 872, 341 S.E.2d at 711.
302. 178 Ga. App. 22, 342 S.E.2d 9 (1986).
303. Id. at 22, 342 S.E.2d at 10.
304. 180 Ga. App. 108, 348 S.E.2d 471 (1986).
305. 234 Ga. 308, 215 S.E.2d 676 (1975).
306. 180 Ga. App. at 110, 348 S.E.2d at 474.
307. 183 Ga. App. 641, 360 S.E.2d 50 (1987).
308. 183 Ga. App. 724, 360 S.E.2d 53 (1987).
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of an extraordinary motion for new trial, later denied by written order.30 1
The court indicated that it would follow Gillen in this context "reluctantly because the procedure followed was erroneous and not in accordance with statutory command."310 The court of appeals belief that it was
compelled by Gillen to approve a premature notice of appeal in the postjudgment motion context, and its holdings in LeGallienne and Eller, were
ratified by the supreme court in Stewart v. State," at least as to resetting motions in criminal cases. 123
In Jinks v. State,3 1 3 the court of appeals held that the trial court'loses
jurisdiction over a criminal case when a notice of appeal is filed. 1 4 After
the supreme court established the motion for stay procedure in Geter, the
court of appeals held in Atkinson v. State1s " that it would not remand the
case to the trial court for decision of a motion for new trial filed by defendant after his notice of appeal. 6 The court observed that it had "no
hesitancy in holding that there has been a waiver of whatever right appellant may otherwise have had to delay this court's resolution of the instant
appeal" because the defendant "filed no motion for a stay. . . " The
court stated more broadly, however, that Geter was distinguishable on
the facts because the losing party in that case had filed the motion, not
the party appealing." 8 Put another way, Geter was an "other-party" appeal, whereas Atkinson was a "same-party" appeal.
The court in Atkinson did not flatly refuse to apply Geter to its facts,
so the appellate courts should be free to hold, in an appropriate case,316
that the decision in Geter applies in the same-party context. Even if the
court of appeals was correct that:
[ilt should be readily apparent that the application of the Geter procedure in a case wherein the same party has filed both the original notice
of appeal and the subsequent motion for new trial has the potential for

309. 183 Ga. App. at 642, 360 S.E.2d at 52.
310. Id. at 641, 360 S.E.2d at 51. The decision does not so indicate, but this probably
was a discretionary application and appeal under section 5-6-35(a)(7). O.C.G.A. § 5-635(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. 1992). This application of Gilen was arguably correct. Among the
eleven types of cases in which a discretionary application is required, only four concern
nonresetting post-judgment proceedings. See O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(5), (7), (8), (10) (1982 &
Supp. 1992).
311. 257 Ga. 211, 356 S.E.2d 515 (1987).
312. Id. at 211 n.1, 356 S.E.2d at 515 n.1.
313. 163 Ga. App. 841, 296 S.E.2d 624 (1982).

314. Id. at 841-42, 296 S.E.2d at 624.
315. 170 Ga. App. 260, 316 S.E.2d 592 (1984).
316. Id. at 261, 316 S.E.2d at 594.
317. Id.at 262, 316 S.E.2d at 594.

318. Id.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 281-93.
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encouraging that very "legal slapJack with notices and motions" that the
supreme court has condemned, 310
the appellate courts' best defense to such a tactic is to apply a rule of
waiver, as the court in Atkinson did, 2 ' that the failure to file a motion for
stay precludes any remand of the case. It is not necessary to go further to
hold or suggest the Geter rule applies only to the situation in which the
movant and the appellant are two different parties, which is inconsistent
with the statute, not grounded in any useful principle of appellate procedure, and too strict to serve as an effective rule of law. Most importantly,
there is much to be said for the appellant who reviews the record in a
timely manner, realizes that a post-judgment motion may resolve the error more effectively than an appeal, and then files and pursues motions
for post-judgment relief and for a stay accordingly.
. Comparing the decision in Atkinson to Taylor v. State,322 in which the
court of appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely, may be useful.123 The
court in Atkinson, faced with defendant's argument that the case should
be returned so the trial court could rule on his motion for new trial,
roundly criticized defendant for attempting to delay, the judicial process
through not disposing of a motion for new trial, "which he apparently
never diligently pursued below . . .
The defendant in Taylor certainly could not be accused of trying to
delay the process, and could have been congratulated for disposing of a
post-trial motion Without even speaking to the busy trial judge, when he
withdrew his motion for new trial so he could proceed on appeal, or so he
thought, under the theory of Allen and Golden.32' Both parties violated
the rules laid down in their cases and the statute, but whereas the defendant in Atkinson received a sort of consolation prize for his dilatory
conduct, an appeal affirming his conviction,320 the defendant in Taylor
received neither the motion for new trial that he had taken pains to withdraw nor the appeal he had hoped to further by withdrawal.32 7 It would
prove too much to. suggest the decision in Taylor was wrong simply because it was inconsistent with Atkinson, but the different treatment accorded to expeditious practice and dilatory practice, as the court in Atkinson described it, underscores the necessity for either judicial or
legislative attention to this area.
320. 170 Ga. App. at 261-62, 316 S.E.2d at 594.
321. Id. at 262, 316 S.E.2d at 594.
322. 173 Ga. App. 745, 327 S.E.2d 860 (1985).
323. Id. at 745, 327 S.E.2d at 860.
324. 170 Ga. App. at 262, 316 S.E.2d at 594.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 256-63.
326. 170 Ga. App. at 264, 316 S.E.2d at 596.
327. 173 Ga. App. at 745, 327 S.E.2d at 860.
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In Boothe v. State,328 the court held that when a notice of appeal and a

motion for new trial were filed on the same day, the notice of appeal, filed
before the motion had been disposed of, was untimely. 2 ' As part of the
court of appeals' changed position on premature notices in the criminal
post-judgment context, 330 the court overruled Boothe in Eller v. State33
in which the notice was filed one day before the dispositive order on a
motion for new trial.332 The court relied on Gillen, Steele, and LeGallienne to hold that a premature notice of 333
criminal appeal filed prior to a
dispository post-judgment order is timely.
The court's overruling of Boothe establishes different rules for civil and
criminal cases for a premature notice of appeal filed on the same day as a
post-judgment resetting motion. Under Eller, the premature notice of appeal in a criminal case is timely even when filed on the same day as a
post-trial motion. In civil cases, the opposite rule obtains under the same
statute.33 4
The Direction of the Premature Judgment Rule in Civil
Cases, in Light of the Criminal Decisions. The effect of the courts'
extension of Gillen to appeals after post-judgment motions in criminal
cases remains uncertain. From the perspective of a civil practitioner, it
would be better to resolve such disagreements within the framework of
criminal constitutional analysis than to adopt rules for appellate jurisdiction and timeliness that differ in civil and criminal cases. The contemporaneous decisions in the civil cases suggest that the premature notice after a post-judgment motion may remain a creature of criminal law and
will not exist in civil appellate cases.
VII.

CONCLUSION

''
"Though this be method, yet there is madness in 't. 3

A.

5

The State of the Appellate Practice Act

The first and ultimate purpose of any law of appellate procedure is to
provide clear answers to two questions. First, when should an appeal be
328. 178 Ga. App. 22, 342 S.E.2d 9 (1986).
329. Id. at 22, 342 S.E.2d at 10.
330. See supra notes 298-312 and accompanying text.
331. 183 Ga. App. 724, 360 S.E.2d 53 (1987).
332. Id. at 724, 360 S.E.2d at 54. The decision in Eller did not expressly overrule Kurtz
v. State, 115 Ga. App. 665, 155 S.E.2d 735 (1967), but there can be no doubt that Kurtz is
dead.
333. 178 Ga. App. at 22, 342 S.E.2d at 10.
334. See supra notes 294-96 and accompanying text.
335., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2 (with apologies).
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filed from an order or judgment? And second, where and how must I file
it? The complexity of post-trial and post-judgment procedure also requires that the Act plainly spell out each step of the process: "this has
happened, what should I do?" and "I have [my*opponent or co-party has)
done that, what will happen?" For all its success in individual cases,
which is indeed considerable, the Georgia courts' approach to the timing
of notices and applications for appeal, both before and after post-judgment motions, has produced a maddening array of procedural interpretations for statutory provisions that have proven too simple for the complex
circumstances they must govern. For now the answer to these basic and
important questions of appellate procedure is, "it depends."
Many of the Georgia courts' decisions appropriately reflect considerable
dissatisfaction with having been required to interpret statutory language
primarily by reference to the underlying policies and only secondarily by
the express provisions of the Act or the consistent application of similar
language." 6 This is not to criticize the courts' approach or the statute
itself, since it has become apparent only years after the enactment of the
Act that the limitations of the statutory language would compromise the
latter, preferable mode of interpretation. 37 The end result, nonetheless, is
that both courts and attorneys are now required to read scores of decisions, some of them in conflict and some adumbrating the possibility of
change, for guidance. Even if the appellate waters be less "murky" now,
they are much deeper than before, and the attorney must "tread warily"
out of vital necessity.

83

It may be asked whether the Georgia appellate courts have taken upon
themselves, in the area of post-judgment and appellate practice, a judicial
role that is largely uncharacteristic of their decisions in other areas. The
Georgia courts have been conservative in the creation of new rules of law,
for example, by refusing to create a common-law cause of action for strict
*products liability,13 9 refusing to extend the UCC warranty claim to wrongful death cases,84 and generally refusing to create new causes of action
336. See generally O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(a), (b) (1982).
337. The court of appeals has observed that when the statutory language is "plain, unambiguous and positive," the courts will construe it to mean what it declares. Bailey v.
Bonaparte, 125 Ga. App. 512, 513, 188 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1972) (citing Sirota v. Kay Homes,
Inc., 208 Ga. 113, 65 S.E.2d 597 (1951)).
338. See Garrett v. Heisler, 149 Ga. App. 240, 253 S.E.2d 863 (1979).
339. Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 239 Ga. 657, 238 S.E.2d 361 (1977); see Whitaker v. Harwell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1969).
340. Lashley v. Ford Motor Co., 480 F.2d 158, 159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1072
(1973). But see Smith, Kline & French Labs. v. Just, 126 Ga. App. 643, 191 S.E.2d 632
(1972); O.C.G.A. §§ 51-4-1 to -5 (1982 & Supp. 1992).
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not recognized at common law, ' 4 1 all in deference to the General Assem-

bly's role in such matters.
The acceptance of jurisdiction over an untimely appeal has as much to
do with the creation of an appellate cause of action as it does with pure
statutory interpretation. Although the courts are a co-equal branch of
government, it has been recognized that the right of appeal is subject to
conditions imposed by the General Assembly, 42 one of which is the timeliness of the notice of appeal. Certainly the courts are best able to design
an effective system of post-judgment and appellate procedure, and the
value of those efforts is manifest in their decisions on issues of appellate
procedure. It remains true that since these improvements have not been
channeled through the legislative process, Georgia has a "nonstatutory"
statute that may work well but does not mean what it says. 4 The Georgia Appellate and Civil Practice Acts therefore would be immeasurably
improved by amendments to codify the best features of the Georgia decisions and general principles of appellate practice.
B. PracticalSuggestions for Attorneys, Trial Courts and Clerks' Offices, and Appellate Courts
Suggestions for Attorneys. For all the success of the Georgia
court's decisions on appellate practice and procedure, the statutes and
judicial decisions require extreme caution by attorneys in the post-trial,
post-judgment and appellate stages of a case. This section of the Conclusion will discuss an approach to appellate practice that should reduce,
although it probably cannot eliminate, the possibility of mistakes that
would be fatal to the appeal.
The first rule of post-judgment and appellate practice is the attorney
should always review the pleadings, orders, and judgments in the clerk's
record on a case. The attorney is the one person responsible for the
timely filing of any motion, notice of appeal, or application, and must
make his or her own determination about the method and timeliness of
filing. Asking the clerk's office for guidance is not fair to the deputy clerk

341. Compare, e.g., Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985) with Woodruff v. Georgia State Univ., 251 Ga. 232, 304 S.E.2d 697 (1983).
342. Fife v. Johnston, 225 Ga. 447, 447, 169 S.E.2d i67, 167-68 (1969); see State v. Hollomon, 132 Ga. App. 304, 306, 208 S.E.2d 167, 168-69 (1974).
343. See Boston & Gunby v. Cummins, 16 Ga. 102 (1854) ("It is exceptions engrafted on
Statutes, by the Courts, that give rise to the uncertainty of the law"). The description of the
Georgia "non-statutory" statute was coined in R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Statutes of Non-Statutory Origin, 14 GA. L. REv. 239 (1980).
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and puts the attorney in an untenable position, even in the rare-and unlikely case in which any error can be corrected.""
The second rule is that the attorney should plan both trial and appellate court filings with the clerk's record in one hand and the statute and
rules of court in the other, to determine whether and when the court has
entered a final order or judgment. The order or judgment must be written
to start the time for appeal, and an oral ruling from the bench does not
affect the time. A post-judgment motion, as its name suggests, should not
be filed prior to the entry of judgment. The decision in Taylor"" counsels
that a movant who wants to appeal should. not simply withdraw the motion; conversely, the other parties to the case should treat the withdrawal
as a final disposition under the decisions in Allen, Golden, and Booker.",
A party should not file a notice of appeal or application while such a
motion is pending, and should file a second notice of appeal after the
entry of a dispositive order on a resetting motion (or any motion that is
arguably a resetting motion). In criminal cases, the notice or application
may be filed earlier.
The third rule is that the attorney should watch the passage of time in
the trial court very carefully. In all cases, the party should file the motion,
notice of appeal, or application at least within the proper time after the
entry of judgment. An extension of time for a final appeal may make the
post-judgment process flow more smoothly. The thirty-day period for filing the notice of appeal runs whether or not the party has actual knowledge or notice that a final judgment has been entered. 47 Therefore, the
best practice is to check the record in all pending cases every two weeks,
or even every week if the attorney is expecting to take an interlocutory
appeal and needs to obtain a certification within ten days of the entry of
an order s'8
344.

The attorney should be particularly careful, prior to filing and entry, to review pro-

posed orders and judgments not only "for form" but also for their significance as markers of
the appellate timetable, and to obtain date-stamped copies of all documents. Despite the
collegial practice enjoyed by most Georgia attorneys, one's adversary has no incentive to
leave shiny pebbles in the appellate path, and probably will not leave even bread crumbs if

that can be avoided.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 264-67, 322-27.
346. See su[5ra text accompanying notes 256-63 and 268-70.
347. Atlantic-Canadian Corp. v. Hammer, Siler, George Assocs., Inc., 167 Ga. App. 257,
257, 306 S.E.2d 22, 23 (1983); see Marion T. Pope, Jr. & Susan Pyeatt Kimmey, Appellate

Practiceand Procedure,36 MERCER L. REv. 79, 85-86 (1984). If the clerk does not give the
notice of entry of judgment required by O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21 (1982), the losing party must
request relief under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(g) (1982). Cambron v. Canal Ins. Co., 246 Ga. 147,
269 S.E.2d 426 (1980); Crawford v. Kroger Co., 183 Ga. App. 836, 360 S.E.2d 274 (1987).
348. Unless the secretary or paralegal assigned this task is trained and authorized to

draw legal conclusions from court papers, the attorney may wish to have copies of any documents prepared and brought to him or her for review.
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The fourth rule of practice is that the attorney should determine
whether another party has filed a post-judgment motion or a notice of
appeal, should determine from the substance of any motion whether it is
a resetting motion, and should be aware that a document filed with the
judge or the clerk may not make its way to the clerk's civil action file on
the day of filing. Consequently, when filing a motion in a civil case, the
attorney may need to determine a day or two later whether a notice had
been filed prior to the day of that filing, which would require the Geter
motion for stay procedure 49 be followed. This process will also include
examination of the terms of any consolidation order to determine whether
the Klein rule 860 is applicable, and of any certification order to determine
whether it is made under section 5-6-34(b) or 9-11-54(b). The attorney's
ability to file a timely post-judgment motion or notice, which is essential,
largely depends upon how well the attorney has read and understood the
parties' filings and the court's orders as contained in the clerk's record.
The fifth rule of practice is that the attorney should communicate with
the clerk of the trial court and the clerk of the appellate court as necessary to ensure that the preparation and transmittal of the record on appeal occurs in a timely and efficient manner. The attorney should provide
written communications or confirm them in writing for the record, and
should follow up on the required filings. This is required both to perfect
an appeal 81 and to satisfy the Geter motion for stay procedure,38 and is
advisable whenever the clerk or the court reporter is engaged in the preparation of the clerk's record or transcript. A post-judgment movant may
need to call the clerk's attention to the continued pendency of an earlierfiled motion, for example, to prevent transmittal once the clerk prepares
the record. 1 3 If a notice of appeal is clearly and certainly untimely, the
appellant may wish to withdraw it, if only for the convenience of the
3
clerk's office. 54
The sixth rule of practice is that the attorney desiring to appeal should
file a notice or application, and perhaps several notices or applications, to
ensure the timeliness of the appeal When in doubt about the resetting
effect of a post-judgment motion. Similarly, when there is any doubt
349. See supra text accompanying notes 281-93.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 173-84.
351. O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-41 to -43 (1982 & Supp. 1992).
352. See supra text accompanying notes 281-93.
353. See Shirley v. State, 188 Ga. App. 357, 373 S.E.2d 257 (1988). For example, in the
Superior Court of Fulton County the appeals clerk's practice is to begin preparing the record when a notice is filed, even though a post-judgment motion is pending. Telephone interview with Susan Buchanan, Deputy Clerk, Superior Court of Fulton County (Sept. 4, 1990).
354. See Denson v. Kloack, 177 Ga. App. 483, 339 S.E.2d 761 (1986). But see Ko v.
Habersham Fed. Sav. Bank, 194 Ga. App. 769, 391 S.E.2d 723 (1990) (notice of appeal
should not have been withdrawn during pendency of nonresetting motion to set aside).
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about whether a direct appeal, an interlocutory appeal, a discretionary
appeal or an interlocutory-discretionary appeal is called for, the attorney
should file a "notice of appeal and/or, in the alternative, application for
interlocutory and/or discretionary appeal" (with a second notice of appeal, if the appellate court grants the application). 5 5 If the order can in
any manner be deemed interlocutory, the trial court should be ,asked to
certify it for appeal and the application and notice should be filed within
the shorter time frames of section 5-6-34(b). Under the present statute, a
motion to extend time probably is not available for a discretionary application or the related notice, and almost certainly is not available for an
interlocutory appeal.
Suggestions for Trial Courts and Clerks' Offices. The trial
courts and clerks' offices potentially have an equally important role in
creating a clear record from which the practicing bar may determine the
time for filing post-judgment motions and notices of appeal. Their doing
so in every case and in a consistent manner could help ease the burden on
the appeals clerks and the appellate courts caused by inappropriately
filed notices of appeal.
The first suggestion is that the trial courts enter every order with full
awareness of the status of the case and the postures of all parties and
motions, consulting with the parties as need be and time permits, and
that the courts enter a document expressly captioned "Final Judgment"
or "Final Judgment as to Defendant ABC Under Section 9-11-54(b)"
when the intent is to make a final disposition of any case or claim, or as
to any party. The courts should clearly distinguish between a section 911-54(b) final determination, which requires specific findings and has a
thirty day timetable, and a section 5-6-34(b) certification, which requires
different findings and has a ten day timetable. Similarly, the courts' labeling a final disposition of a resetting post-trial motion as "Dispositive
Order on Plaintiff XYZ's Motion for New Trial Under O.C.G.A. § 5-638(a)" would indicate to the parties that an event affecting the time for
appeal has occurred. A consistent and uniform practice would simplify
the post-judgment practice for the trial and appellate courts, their clerks,
and the parties.
The second suggestion is that the trial courts and clerks enter final
judgments by filing them on the same day they are signed and file documents received from the parties on the same day they are received. To
the extent that this cannot be done, the use of filing stamps reflecting
only a single date of filing, with the notation "received" for whatever
355. See Southeast Ceramics, Inc. v. Klem, 246 Ga. 294, 271 S.E.2d 199 (1980) (superfluous application for interlocutory appeal does not vitiate proper appeal).
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other dates are needed for internal management purposes,8" would provide all concerned with an unambiguous record.
Suggestions for Appellate Courts. The Georgia appellate courts
may wish to consider the following specific points about the case law that
has developed under the Appellate Practice Act since 1965. First, the
courts may wish to address expressly whether the Stewart rule on premature notices of criminal appeal after disposition of post-judgment motions
will be extended to civil cases, despite Smith and Glenridge Unit Owners.
The hope is respectfully expressed that these rules will not be extended,
but be limited to the criminal context in which they are better supported
by the policies underlying direct criminal appeals.
Second, the appellate courts may wish to clarify the meaning of those
decisions that do not track the language of the Appellate and Civil Practice Acts with respect to the setting and running of the time for appeal.
Using such terminology as a "resetting" motion and expressly abandoning
such terminology as "tolling ' or "extending" the time for appeal and
"discretionary motions to set aside" in favor of more accurate terminology, would assist in that process.
Third, the appellate courts may wish to address the problems raised by
the decisions in Kalb, Klein, Haggard, and Yancey,' 57 and to consider
whether Yancey should be overruled. If different rules are to obtain in
the simple judgment and post-judgment motion contexts, it may be that
the analytical bases for those differences could be explained more fully to
provide better roadmaps for practicing attorneys.
Fourth, the courts may wish to consider whether a sanction other than
dismissal of the appeal could be developed for the movant-appellant in a
case like Taylor v. State,8 " to prevent the dilatory filing of a post-judgment motion in civil or criminal cases." 9 Along with that issue the courts
could address whether the holding in Taylor should be overruled, if only
for the sake of consistency. This would permit the simple withdrawal of a
post-judgment motion to reset the time for appeal in a criminal case or a
"same-party" civil case just as in the case in which the movant and appellant are different parties.
Fifth, the courts may wish to clarify the meaning of the decision in
Crumbley v. Wyant,'" regarding the finality of orders in the trial court
after remittitur from an interlocutory appeal.
356. See supra note 32 and text accompanying notes 31-32.
357. See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
358. See supra text accompanying 264-67 and 322-27.
359. Cf. Williamscraft Dev., Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 196 Ga. App. 703, 397 S.E.2d
122 (1990); O.C.G.A. § 5-6-6 (1982 & Supp. 1992).
360. See supra text accompanying notes 271-74.
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Sixth, the courts may wish to consider whether the motion for stay
called for by the Geter motion-for-stay procedure should be filed in the
trial court as well as the appellate court, so the trial court clerk's office
will be alerted in the same manner as the clerk of the appellate court.
Seventh, the appellate courts may wish to consider establishing court
rules and a regular practice for an appellate motions docket to handle
motions to dismiss appeals and other procedural motions, particularly if
the General Assembly adopts the Geter motion-for-stay procedure as a
permanent component of the Georgia practice. It is very expensive for the
parties and time-consuming for the courts to brief and hear cases on the
merits that should be dismissed for procedural reasons. Presently the parties have no choice but to file the required briefs if the courts will not
hear motions sooner than the submission of the entire case for decision. A
preliminary determination is effectively required under Geter and Rich, 61
and under the discretionary appeals statute, and a general screening procedure could be handled from the substantive appellate docket. Although
the preliminary disposition of procedural motions may appear to be more
time-consuming, it actually may save time and resources for all
concerned.
Finally, in the legislative arena, the courts' advice and direction are
needed to determine what form any amendments to sections 5-6-34 and
5-6-35, as well as other sections of the Appellate Practice Act, should
take. The author respectfully expresses the hope that the courts will embrace the study and proposal of amending legislation as part of the same
process as the judicial decisions by which needed solutions to appellate
problems have been sought.

361.

See supra text accompanying notes 281-93.

